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The James McCormick Mitchell Lecture
Looking Toward the Future:
Feminism and Reproductive Technologies
ISABEL MARCUS-MODERATOR
RHONDA COPELON,
RUTH HUBBARD,
BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN,
BARBARA OMOLADE-- NVERSANTS*
I. MORNING SEssIoN: THE TECHNOLOGY
ISABEL MARCUS: We have arranged a program with a number of con-
versants so that you can hear different perspectives on an extremely
complicated set of issues which demand careful, thoughtful considera-
tion. Our goal is to explore -the impact and implications of alternative
reproductive technologies for feminism and for feminists. We have in-
vited Professor Ruth Hubbard, an internationally known authority in
this area and a woman of great social conscience, from Harvard Univer-
sity's Department of Biology. After Professor Hubbard's presentation,
she will join in a morning conversation with Barbara Omolade, of the
Center for Worker Education at the City University of New York, and
Professor Barbara Katz Rothman, also from the City University of New
York. They will discuss the social, cultural, and economic contexts in
which alternative reproductive technologies are embedded.
After lunch we shall focus on the legal issues posed by the new re-
productive technologies. That conversation will be shared by Professor
Rhonda Copelon of the City University of New York Law School at
Queens College, myself, Isabel Marcus from SUNY-Buffalo Law School,
the morning's conversants, and all of you.
Ruth Hubbard: I have been asked to explain the technologies that
* This Article is an edited transcript of the discussion held on March 17, 1987 at the Law
School of the State University of New York at Buffalo as part of the James McCormick Mitchell
Lecture Series.
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underlie the legal, political, and ethical issues that we will be talking
about. Obviously the technical issues are embedded in societal decisions
and beliefs, and it is impossible to separate them. I will try to explain the
more technical aspects, but feel free to raise questions as they come up.
The place to start, even if we are just going to look at the technical
issues, is to ask how we got here. Why are we trying to invent new ways
of producing babies and why are we developing techniques to assess the
health of fetuses before they are born? To understand that, we have to
acknowledge several things. One is the medicalization of life in general.
We use health and sickness as metaphors: healthy means good, as in
"healthy relationships," and sick means bad, as in "a sick society."
More significantly, we look for individualized medical and technical
solutions to social problems. The inability to generate or conceive or ges-
tate our own biological children could be tackled socially by expanding
the concept of family-the people who are considered grandparents, par-
ents, uncles, and so on. Instead, we insist on a narrow definition of family
that doesn't reflect most people's experience. Family is one mother, one
father, and one or more children. With present divorce and custody ar-
rangements and single parent families, many and perhaps most children's
families consist of a mother and her partner or partners and their chil-
dren, a father and his partner or partners and children, and lots of grand-
parents. We also have precedents in adoption, and now in open adoption.
Society's treatment of adoption is interesting in this regard because it has
tried to become more open and tolerant of less conventional arrange-
ments. But when it comes to the new reproductive technologies and ar-
rangements, in which a child can have five potential parents-a sperm
donor, an egg donor, the woman who gestates, and two social parents-
we insist that only two of them can be real parents, and the others are
.. ? We don't know what to call them, but they are not parents. So that
is a peculiar contradiction.
The other thing we need to think about carefully is the individualis-
tic concept and language of rights which we have perpetuated in the civil
rights and women's rights movements. Our legal structure forces us to
talk about rights in individual terms, and so lays the groundwork for
justifying some of the new reproductive technologies. It is this structure
which leads to statements like: "Every couple (or every woman) has a
right to have a child"; "Every couple (or woman) has a right to a healthy
child"; and "Every child has a right to be born healthy," which by a
peculiar sleight of hand gets transmuted into "A child that is not going
to be healthy has no right to born." So we suddenly have these rights to
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reproductive technologies, both technologies to help a fertile couple have
children and technologies for the prenatal diagnosis of disabilities and
diseases.
First, let's think about the new technologies for producing children.
Presumably the reason for them is that men, women, or couples find they
cannot generate or gestate children. Some say the rate of infertility
among both men and women has been increasing, although there is disa-
greement about this, as well as about the proper criteria of infertility. In
any case, about one couple in six cannot conceive a child within one year
of regular, unprotected intercourse. This number is relatively evenly di-
vided between couples in which the man cannot produce an adequate
amount of sperm or sufficiently mobile sperm, the woman either cannot
produce eggs or gestate embryos, or both partners have problems.
Why is infertility increasing, if it is? There are various social rea-
sons, including pollution and workplace hazards such as chemicals and
radiation. Lots of women work in technical capacities, in hospitals, as
beauticians, and in jobs that have reproductive hazards associated with
them. So do many men. Then there is what has been called the sexual
revolution. Various forms of contraception, specifically female contracep-
tion such as the pill and other hormone contraceptives, can result in tem-
porary or permanent infertility. The IUD can, and often does, lead to
infection, which in turn can either prevent conception or impair the abil-
ity of the uterus to carry an implant. And sexually transmitted diseases
which can cause sterility, such as gonorrhea, chlamydia, -and, again, pel-
vic inflammatory disease, have been increasing. We are also told that
delayed childbearing plays a role. That is an ideologically loaded subject
and there are differences of opinion on the extent to which this is correct.
Obviously, if women delay child bearing beyond age forty or forty-five,
there are going to be problems. But whether delayed childbearing beyond
age thirty or thirty-five creates problems, that's more questionable. There
are also social reasons, such as lesbian parenthood and gay parenthood,
which lead some people to look to reproductive technologies to get an
egg and sperm together.
There are four main technologies in use, two quite old and two new.
The oldest is artificial insemination by donor, also called donor insemina-
tion by people who don't like the word artificial in there. Here the issues
are mostly social and legal. While donor insemination is often performed
in a medical setting, people can do it in the privacy of their own home.
All that is required is that a man masturbate into a condom or some
other container. His sperm is handed over to a woman who uses a turkey
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baster or a syringe to get the sperm close to her cervix. Then she waits to
see whether it takes. The technical issues mostly have to do with the
medicalization of this process, such as differences in effectiveness of fro-
zen and fresh sperm. Using frozen sperm makes it possible to screen, say,
for AIDS. It also makes it easier to preserve the anonymity of the donor,
and obviates the need for the donor to provide sperm at a specific time,
when the woman is about to ovulate. Physicians and sperm banks tend to
use frozen sperm for these reasons.
People who are interested in sex selection might want to use donor
insemination. Since the sperm determines the sex of the child, availability
of sperm in a test tube raises the possibility of sorting sperm that contain
an X-chromosome and will therefore produce girls, and those that con-
tain a Y-chromosome and will produce boys. People resort to donor in-
semination for sex selection or for social or medical reasons. Donor
insemination is used to avoid diseases that are more prevalent in males. It
is also used by some couples when the male partner has a low sperm
count. Sperm can be concentrated by separating the ejaculum into early
and later phases and using only the early ejaculum, which contains most
of the sperm. This is called artificial insemination by husband, but in-
creasingly it has been replaced by the more high technology procedure of
in vitro fertilization which we will talk about in a moment.
The second technology, which clearly is not very technological, is
what has been called surrogate motherhood. I will say very little about
this now. I am sure you all have been hearing and reading about it and
we can talk about it later. Basically, it involves donor insemination and
the issues are economic and social and legal, having to do with pay to the
woman and to the mediators and arrangers of this transaction, with the
ability to contract, with custody issues, and so on.
So let's talk about the two more complicated techniques: in vitro
fertilization and embryo flushing and transfer. I was very surprised about
a year or year-and-a-half ago to have a legal expert in a panel such as this
refer to in vitro as the simplest of all the procedures. He was, of course,
speaking from a legal perspective. It is true that usually the donated egg
is from the woman who expects to be the social mother and the donated
sperm is from the man who expects to be the social father. Since we are
talking about only one possible mother and father, we don't have to ask,
"Who are the parents?" Beyond that simplicity, however, it is a techni-
cally complicated procedure, considerably more complex than the previ-
ous ones. Before the procedure, the woman who donates the egg has to
undergo a host of tests. There is usually exploratory surgery to be sure
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the ovaries are accessible. She is routinely treated with hormones, so-
called fertility drugs, to know the time at which the ovary is going to
release the eggs and to stimulate it to produce more than one egg. Nowa-
days it is considered better to fertilize several eggs and transfer several
embryos into the uterus at the same time to improve the chances that one
will implant. The process of implantation is the weakest link in the in
vitro sequence.
What you have to consider, then, is a whole set of preliminary pro-
cedures that screen the woman to find out whether she is even a reason-
able candidate for in vitro and screen the man to see if he has enough
sperm. These screenings are followed by exploratory surgery and chemi-
cal intervention, after which comes the surgical procedure, called
laparoscopy, by which the eggs are removed from the ovary. It has to be
done under anesthesia which carries its own risks. Once the eggs and
sperm have been collected, fertilization occurs in a carefully developed
bacteria-free medium, in a small glass dish at the appropriate
temperature.
At this point let me digress for a few moments and give you a quick
rundown of early human embryology. One of the scientific advantages
from this technology is that we have learned a lot more about early
human embryology than we knew when the science depended on looking
at early miscarriages, or at women who had to have operations or who
died during early pregnancy. Immediately after fertilization, the fertil-
ized egg is called a zygote. It begins to divide during the first few hours
so that after three divisions you get an eight-cell embryo which they have
begun to call a pre-embryo rather than an embryo. I think this novel
term has been coined more for social than scientific reasons. The implica-
tion is: It is not yet human, not even an embryo; it is a pre-embryo. At
the eight-cell stage, that is after the first three divisions, all the cells are
not only genetically identical, but they are still equivalent and equi-po-
tential. That means if the embryo breaks in half or if one removes a cell,
each cell and each clump of cells can generate a complete embryo. Noth-
ing has been determined yet about where the cell is going to end up or
what kind of a cell (liver, kidney, heart) it is going to be. That is impor-
tant because it opens possibilities for genetic screening.
Although this is not being done yet, it is perfectly possible to go to
an eight-cell embryo, remove one of the cells, freeze the rest, screen that
one cell, find out what genetic problems it has, and then either discard
the rest of the embryo if the future parents don't like the screening results
or do genetic engineering, so-called gene therapy, and reimplant it. This
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would be the most logical place to do genetic engineering. It is not tech-
nically feasible yet, but it is certainly a possibility and a likely technical
development about which we should be making social and legal decisions
now. Changes made at this stage would manifest themselves not only in
that individual but would be passed on to his or her offspring.
By about two sets of divisions later, at about the thirty-two-cell
stage, the pre-embryo begins to differentiate. Until this stage, there is
essentially no net growth. The embryo is about the same size as the fertil-
ized egg was. As the cells have been dividing, they have gotten smaller.
From here on, the cells not only divide but they begin to differentiate and
develop into the different kinds of tissues and organs in the body.
Around this time or shortly after, in the natural process of fertilization,
the embryo would reach the uterus and begin to implant. This would be
several days down the road from in vitro fertilization. By the time the
embryo implants, there is a clear distinction between its outer and inner
layer, or the inner embryo. The outer layer goes through the first and
most comprehensive differentiation to establish communication between
the embryo and the pregnant woman's uterine lining, so the exchange of
nutrients and wastes can begin between the embryo and the mother. In
the ordinary course of events, sometime early during the second week
after fertilization, the embryo becomes established within the uterine
wall. The inner mass, which then becomes the embryo proper, begins to
differentiate, first into two layers and then into three. That is really the
first point where you can be sure that this is going to develop into a single
individual rather than identical twins, because different cells have begun
to take on different destinies, so to speak. They can still substitute for
each other and there is much more flexibility at these early stages then
there will be later on.
In Britain, it is permissible to let embryos develop in vitro up to this
stage. The same limit has been suggested by the Fertility Society in this
country. After fourteen days the cells are what is called determined. The
growing individual is called an embryo rather than a pre-embryo. Be-
yond this point it should not be experimented on.
In in vitro fertilization the embryo is introduced into the uterus
much earlier than this, around the six- or eight-cell stage. This is done
without anesthesia. It is essentially the opposite of an abortion and rela-
tively painless. A rather thin tube that contains the drop of fluid with the
early embryo (usually three embryos) is inserted through the cervix. It is
important not to dilate the cervix since you want it to retain that drop of
fluid and the embryo.
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Most of the failures of in vitro happen around implantation. It is
generally assumed that in the usual, normal pregnancy, of three or four
embryos that make it into the uterus, only one actually implants and
develops. Most do not. In in vitro fertilization, the best that has been
done is about a one in five chance of implanting. But that does not mean
that all of these will lead to successful outcomes. That is important to
bear in mind because people who inquire about the success rate at a lot of
in vitro clinics are told that it is twenty percent-one in five-which they
take to mean one chance in five of having a baby. That is not true. There
may be one chance in five of the embryo implanting, but there are lots of
losses beyond that. The successful outcome rate varies enormously
among the centers that do the procedure. In Britain, there are eight clin-
ics altogether. One, Steptoe's and Edwards', has had most of the success-
ful fertilizations; the others have much lower success rates. Interestingly
enough, in Britain as of 1985 there had been about 200 babies born out of
eight clinics; in this country by mid-1985 something on the order of 180
babies had been born out of 108 clinics. Here, too, a handful of clinics
accounts for most births. There are many clinics that have not produced
any babies, but that advertise success rates based on the number of em-
bryos that implant, sometimes only for hours or days. There are also
quite a number of multiple births, twins or even triplets, because, as I
mentioned before, the chances of success go up if physicians implant up
to three embryos. If they implant more, chances begin to go down again.
If multiple pregnancies occur they get counted as separate babies, so it is
important to be aware that marketing strategies are concealed in the
data.
The other thing to be clear about is the result of having private orga-
nizations develop reproductive technology. If private clinics are going to
offer this complex technology under a capitalist, for-profit system, they
are going to expand the market for it. Initially, in vitro fertilization was
promoted for a rather small number of possible clients: women with in-
tact ovaries and an intact uterus who lacked fallopian tubes, or women
whose fallopian tubes were sealed off. Now it is also being promoted for
the partners of men with low sperm counts (because it is easier to control
fertilization in a dish if there are fewer than the usual number of sperm)
and for couples whose infertility is of unknown origin. If in vitro fertiliza-
tion becomes an accepted way of doing genetic screening, then the door
is open to promoting it for whoever wants it and can pay for it.
The fourth technology I mentioned is embryo flushing and transfer,
which is used much less than in vitro fertilization. Embryo flushing is
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being developed entirely in private hands, for profit. It is a standard agri-
cultural practice used for cattle and other farm animals. A few days after
artificial insemination, the embryo is flushed out through the cervix. That
embryo can be frozen and stored for later transfer, or transferred directly
to the gestating cow. Or woman. The medical reasons for doing this with
people would be, say, if a woman cannot produce eggs and perhaps does
not have intact fallopian tubes but has an intact uterus, or she can pro-
duce eggs but cannot gestate an embryo. In either case, you can get dona-
tion of the embryo, that is, a transfer of the embryo from the woman who
has eggs to the woman who can gestate. The point is that the gestating
woman is different from the woman who provides the egg. The health
risks have to do with the repeated lavage or flushing of the uterus to
collect the embryo, which carries with it discomfort and the risk of infec-
tion. Since the embryo cannot always be flushed out, the woman who
planned to donate her egg to a woman who was going to gestate the baby
and be its social mother may find herself pregnant and then have to de-
cide whether to carry the baby to term or have an abortion.
All four of these techniques are costly and, therefore, raise class and
racial issues. Donor insemination is the cheapest, although its expense
depends on whether one uses a medicalized form or does it privately. The
Oakland Feminist Health Center, which uses frozen sperm, charges
something like $1,500 for the initial work up and access to sperm and
then $150 per attempt at insemination. That is pretty expensive if it takes
an average of five or six tries. Surrogacy costs around $10,000 for the
woman who is going to gestate the baby and another $30,000 or so for
the broker and other fees, plus the expense of the pregnancy and birth. In
vitro, which is also very expensive, costs something on the order of
$4,000 per cycle. That is just for the work up and the initial procedure,
and does not include the pregnancy and birth. This is often done by cae-
sarean, which is more expensive and riskier for the woman than vaginal
birth. Caesareans are used because an in vitro pregnancies and many of
the other pregnancies that result from special fertility procedures are per-
ceived as "precious" pregnancies. Physicians in general try to have the
most control they can of a precious pregnancy. Since they tend to think
that they have better control of the birth process by doing a caesarean,
that's what they prefer to do.
Another issue to consider is that, although many of these proce-
dures are still experimental, the people who participate are expected to
pay. The procedures do not follow experimental protocols and are not
considered studies, where people who enroll do not have to pay. Class
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and race bias is inevitable not only because of the expense, but because
infertility rates are higher among poor people and especially among peo-
ple of color because of reproductive hazards at work and because the
incidence of disease, including venereal disease, is higher than among af-
fluent people. The techniques are clearly being developed for middle and
upper middle class people, for those who can pay. That is especially true
in this country, the only industrialized country besides South Africa that
does not have some form of national health insurance which pays for and
monitors medical procedures.
Finally, a few words about prenatal tests. Here again I will stress
the more technical issues and leave questions about why these tests are
being developed for later. I am sure you are aware that more and more
tests are coming on the market. They fall into several categories. The
least invasive and painful, I suppose, is ultrasound imaging. Its risks are
still being debated. All we can tell at this point is that there do not seem
to be ill consequences that are noticeable at birth or in early childhood.
Unfortunately, studies have only begun on long-term effects. Since the
method is already in widespread use, it is difficult to say just what will
happen if, in ten or fifteen or twenty years, longitudinal studies show (as
they did with x-rays) that health problems are associated with exposure
to ultrasound.
The next least invasive procedures are blood tests. The one that is
most generally being done and advocated is the maternal serum alpha
fetoprotein (MSAFP) test to detect neural tube defects. These are
problems in the closure of the spinal cord. Because this test is getting to
be so widespread, I want to concentrate on it to illustrate the problems.
But first, let me explain about two other sets of procedures that are
more invasive. One is chorionic villus sampling (CVS) which is a way of
removing fetal cells for testing early in the pregnancy, during the eighth
to tenth week. In CVS, a small amount of the outer layer which the em-
bryo develops to get in contact with the uterus is withdrawn through the
cervix. The other procedure is amniocentesis, which also samples embry-
onic cells, but can only be done after the sixteenth to eighteenth week,
during the second trimester. Both chorionic villus sampling and amni-
ocentesis make it possible to diagnose a number of genetic or develop-
mental problems in the fetus. This allows the woman, or couple, the
decision to abort if the fetus has a health problem with which they feel
they cannot cope, or gives them time to collect information and resources
to be ready for the baby when it is born.
Let me now say a few words about maternal serum alpha fetoprotein
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screening because this test is widely advocated for all pregnant women,
not just for specific women who might want it because of their health
histories. California has now instituted a program whereby every preg-
nant woman must be offered the test and sign either a consent or a refusal
form during the fourteenth or fifteenth week of her pregnancy, when this
test is usually administered.' I choose this test because it illustrates some
of the problems with screening. For one thing, neural tube defects vary in
severity from fatal or extremely disabling to very mild. A lot of people
walk around with mild forms of spina bifada without most of us being
aware that they have any disability. At the other extreme is anencephaly,
in which the fetus lacks a brain and dies in utero or the baby dies shortly
after it is born. The MSAFP test gives no information about the degree of
the disability, merely that there is one. How can one make rational deci-
sions on the basis of this information? Neural tube defects are not genetic
and nobody really knows why they occur, but their incidence varies
among different parts of the country and among different countries. In
California, where the test is now offered to every pregnant woman, the
incidence is about one in one thousand births. It is fairly rare by compar-
ison with other health problems that a lot of women, particularly poorer
women, have to deal with. So one question is, how much time a health
care provider should put into diagnosing a relatively rare disease in the
face of other, much more pressing, health problems.
The rate of positives on the MSAFP test is five percent, meaning
fifty per thousand. With an actual incidence of one per thousand, that
means that on a first test forty-nine people will get a positive reading who
in fact are not carrying a fetus with a neural tube defect at all. They will
then have to go through further tests, possibly including amniocentesis,
to figure out whether the fetus they are carrying actually has a neural
tube defect. This takes weeks and, of course, is stressful. One of the
things that troubles me about this is that the stress a pregnant woman
experiences is communicated to her fetus, as is everything that affects her
hormones, blood pressure, and state of well being. But this is usually not
considered when assessing risks. The reason for the very high rate of
wrong diagnoses is because alpha fetoprotein levels in the pregnant wo-
man's blood change in the course of pregnancy. Therefore, if the dating
of the pregnancy is off by a week or two, which it can easily be, or if the
woman is carrying more than one fetus, that will throw the value off.
1. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 289.7 (Deering 1988).
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There can also be technical errors and differences in standards used by
different laboratories.
For this procedure, too, the market is being expanded. Physicians
have begun to suggest that MSAFP screening detects not only neural
tube defects, but also Down's Syndrome. Elevated levels indicate a neural
tube defect; low levels indicate Down's. But the decision of what is nor-
mal, low, and high is somewhat arbitrary. It is based on a distribution
curve for a color test and different laboratories draw the curves differ-
ently and differ in their interpretation of what is normal, high, and low,
so there is considerable ambiguity in test results. Yet, when a woman is
told she may be carrying a fetus with a neural tube defect or Down's
Syndrome, it is a serious matter for her.
For all these tests, we need to ask why we want to know in the first
place. Physicians act as though the information we can get is a great deal
more rigorous and certain than it is, and that the decisions concerning
what to do about it are a lot clearer than they really are. This fosters the
illusion that we can make pregnancy a great deal more predictable, and
that it would benefit us if we could. It also ignores and diverts attention
from the fact that, in this country, the main reason babies are born with
disabilities and illnesses, or even die, is poverty and not inherited defects.
As with the infertility treatments, these tests are being developed for
middle and upper class women and not for the women and infants at
greater risk.
Barbara Katz Rothman: Ruth has been putting this in context issue
by issue. I would like to look at the development of a range of technolo-
gies and put what is happening in the context of our ideology. Mother-
hood is becoming a media staple these days. We hear about drug
addicted mothers, mothers who are very young (twelve, thirteen, four-
teen years old), mothers who are considerably older, the so-called late
childbearing mothers, abusive mothers, infertile would-be mothers, and
so-called surrogate mothers. Anybody who reads the newspaper would
conclude that motherhood is in some kind of cultural turmoil. There has
been an ongoing attempt, a feminist attempt, to deal with the changing
experience of motherhood.
In these truly troubled times I think there's a pattern to what is
happening. Babies and children, or some babies and some children, are
becoming increasingly precious, while motherhood is becoming increas-
ingly less precious. Motherhood is becoming devalued or proletarianized.
Biological motherhood, as well as social nurturing motherhood, is being
seen as cheap labor. This is most obvious with the surrogate mother.
1988/891
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Surrogacy entails the notion that one can rent a womb and can affix an
arbitrary price tag on pregnancy, often $10,000. This price has stayed
fixed for the past decade. While the cost of everything else has risen, the
cost of surrogacy stays the same. This is as clear a case of devaluation as
I've ever seen, spelled out in dollars and cents. The cost of the brokers
has increased. It used to cost approximately $20,000 to purchase a baby
through surrogacy contracts. It now costs approximately $30,000.
Not only are we devaluing motherhood in a very clear, economically
measurable way, we are also looking at motherhood as a production pro-
cess, as cheap labor, as work, and we are increasingly applying the stan-
dards of work to motherhood. When I first started to look at prenatal
diagnosis, genetic counseling, and the whole phenomenon of wrongful
life suits, I saw developments leading to treating the fetus as a commod-
ity. My friend and colleague Rosalyn Weinman Schram helped me
phrase it. Genetic counseling is serving the purpose of quality control,
and wrongful life suits are a variety of product liability litigation. Moth-
erhood is now seen as a work process, babies as a product, and we are
beginning to see some quality control of the product. We are beginning to
think of the baby as a purchasable and perfectable commodity. We are
beginning to put different price tags on different products.
The pricing down of motherhood services goes along with the devel-
opment of work standards. The notion arises that pregnant women have
to adhere to certain work protocols, such as not drinking during preg-
nancy. More dramatically, we have the incredible, bizarre story of
charges brought against a San Diego mother for not having called her
doctor early enough in labor and having sex with her husband during the
pregnancy.' We have the development of court-ordered caesarean sec-
tions, with the juvenile court taking custody of the fetus and ordering the
surgery for the benefit of the fetus.' I feel like Alice in Wonderland at
the Mad Hatter's tea party, seeing an attorney represent the fetus and a
separate attorney represent the mother, when they are one person on the
bed. We have the beginning of the language of fetal abuse developing out
of the concept of child abuse. We are looking at such things as warnings
in bars regarding drinking during pregnancy. Absolutely related to these
phenomona are Baby Doe squads. They enter after pregnancy, but often
what you are looking at is an extrauterine fetus, that is a very very early
premature fetus, of which the court can take custody.4
2. People v. Stewart, M508197 (Mun. Ct., San Diego Cty. 1986).
3. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
4. Annotation, Power of Court or Other Public Agency to Order Medical Treatment over Parental
[Vol. 37
LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE:
Mothers are increasingly not trusted. It has been a long time since
anyone has trusted mothers, but the working philosophy used to be that
mothers had their babies' best interests at heart. Mothers might not have
been intelligent enough to figure things out. We needed Dr. Spock to tell
us how to take care of our babies. But the notion was that we basically
wanted to take care of our babies, and just needed some nice firm assur-
ance how to do it. Now the culture suggests that we don't necessarily
want to take care of the babies, that we have to be watched because we
really are selfish. Selfish is replacing selfless in the current ideology of
motherhood in America.
In the past we were treated to images conveying the message that
mothers protected babies at all costs and under all circumstances. We
became superhuman in our abilities to save our children. The current
image is starkly different. Doctors have the best interest of babies at
heart; the state has the best interest of babies at heart; lawyers have the
best interest of babies at heart. The people in America who absolutely
cannot be trusted to have babies' interests at heart are mothers. Mothers
may drink or smoke or do other dangerous things. They don't really care
about babies the way doctors and lawyers and other responsible people
do. We have a shifting of imagery from the classic stories of the 1950s in
which doctors advise a mother with a damaged baby to institutionalize it,
abandon it, and the mother says, "Never, not my baby!" and goes from
doctor to doctor fighting the world to make her baby a happy person. In
the new story, the baby has a missing toe, the mother doesn't want it, and
the state has to save it from this evil mother who abandons it.
Some people think that it is just a backlash to the women's move-
ment. If we have made noises about looking out for our own interests
then, clearly, we are no longer as selfless as we used to be. Therefore, we
can't be trusted to look out for our babies' interests. I'm not saying that
there has been any real change in maternal protectiveness. We haven't
Religious Objections for Child Whose Life Is Not Immediately Endangered, 52 A.L.R.3d 1118 (1980);
Annotation, Power of Court or Other Public Agency to Order Medical Treatment over Parental Reli-
gious Objections Not Based on Religious Grounds, 97 A.L.R.3d 421 (1980). But see Bowen v. Ameri-
can Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986) (striking down regulations by the Department of Health and
Human Services which required hospitals to provide health care to mentally or physically handi-
capped infants when, in the judgment of the Department, the health care was necessary to protect
the child's life, parental consent notwithstanding); see also In Re Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60
N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983) (uphold-
ing dismissal of action seeking judicial authorization for surgery on infant with spina bifida, where
plaintiff was unrelated to infant and parents had decided against surgery).
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gotten any worse about watching out for our babies. We just aren't
trusted anymore.
One of the more bizarre examples of this shift in ideology was
presented at a meeting of doctors and lawyers. An ethicist talked about a
fetal surgery program in which they could do surgery that would help
babies. Of course, to do surgery on a fetus you have to slice right through
its mother. So the ethicist thought they would need an advocate to repre-
sent the fetus, because the fetus' interests were seen to be in conflict with
the mother's interest. She would not want to be sliced into, but the fetus
needed the surgery. The ethicist said that he found that doctors actually
were talking the mothers out of the surgery. Mothers would come beg-
ging and the doctors would say, "There is a really small chance of suc-
cess. You have a young child at home. Do you really want to risk
yourself in this kind of major surgery? This baby is probably going to die
anyway." The mothers would say, "If there is a chance in a million,
please save my baby." The ethicist said he was really surprised to dis-
cover that the mothers actually turned out to be advocates for the fetus.
And I thought, give this man ten more minutes and he will discover
apple pie.
Our society's approach to reproduction grows out of a patriarchal
analysis that seeds are precious and the genetic tie between generations is
a very important one. In this analysis, mothers are essentially fungible.
You can plant the seeds here. You can plant the seeds there. It doesn't
make a lot of difference. They grow a baby. From a woman's point of
view, you could get pregnant with this man or you could get pregnant
with that man. You still get a big belly. Your breasts still flow with milk.
You will produce a baby. You may prefer one man's seed to another, but
the essence of creating a baby is not going to be which seed gets planted.
From the man's perspective, the only connection is the seed, that genetic
tie, not where it is planted. From this patriarchal perspective, the crucial
consideration is control of the environment. So now we can make substi-
tutions in the environment for the seed. We can finish the last few
months of pregnancy in an incubator or even in a dead mother. We can
substitute a glass dish for the nurturing environment of a womb because
we don't need the mother. What we have to do is take this seed and
gestate it somehow, somewhere, so this particular seed-not that one or
that one-so this particular, precious seed, grows into a baby.
Not all seeds are equally precious. There are two levels on which
this ranking of seeds happens: a macro and a micro level. We look at
reproduction with an agricultural approach, to decide which seeds we
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will cultivate, which we will develop and treat as precious, and which are
expendable. On the macro level, which includes racism, we say we have
plenty of some kinds of babies. We want to do birth control with that
population. Some years ago I accompanied a student doing research on
infertility to a major infertility center. We asked, what kinds of payment
do you accept? The staff told us that people who don't have private insur-
ance or the money for the treatment would not want to get pregnant. On
the micro level, there is another kind of eugenics program: genetic
screening. The seeds with an extra twenty-first chromosome, which will
make people with Down's Syndrome, are not precious seeds. We don't
want those. Some people fear the seeds that don't have a Y-chromosome,
female seeds, are not going to be as precious.
Barbara Omolade: In my analysis of the current urgency around
mechanical and artificial reproduction, three concepts underlie the social
implications of the new reproductive technologies: (1) the continuation
and expansion of the racial patriarchy in the United States; (2) the uni-
versal urgency to reproduce biologically; and (3) the technological dis-
crepancy between the social and biological reproduction of white people
and people of color with its attendant allocation of resources for different
groups.
All the issues around reproduction are tied in with power, and with
how powerful men function and organize our society. White women and
women of color each occupy a separate but interconnected place in the
social hierarchy. They are usually unaware of the comprehensive organi-
zation of social control. One week, Mary Beth Whitehead is described
as not being a capable mother, in part because she demanded to mother
the child she was hired to birth. The next week, teenage mothers, espe-
cially black teenage mothers, are characterized as inept, incapable, and
confused, in part because they demand to have children although they
are young. In spite of differences between the experiences of these white
and black mothers, both are attacked in the media as unfit. This attack is
part of a general attack on motherhood which has been going on since
the beginning of the country.
The first concept is the development of the racial patriarchy: a group
of men who use racism and racial violence to control men and women of
color, and to usurp the traditional patriarchal relationships between men
and women. During the earliest stages of United States history, a numeri-
cal minority of white European men took political and economic control
using military power. They were surrounded by nations of native Ameri-
cans, indentured white labor, and African slave labor. The racial pa-
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triarchs established a social order in which everyone had a carefully
prescribed place: Africans were to become perpetual bonded cheap man-
ual labor; whites were to be semi-free labor (wage earners, independent
farmers, and merchants); and Native Americans were to be annihilated.
That social order has been held in place by a combination of ideology,
social law, and economic control.
The social order that racial patriarchs established has always con-
tained a sexual and sexist component centered around the control of all
women's sexuality and reproduction. The first laws of the country were
organized around the children of indentured and slave mothers. A 1662
Virginia statute stipulated that "all offspring follow the condition of the
mother in the event of a white man getting a Negro with child."' The
child of a slave mother would be a slave, irrespective of its father. The
traditional patriarchal relationship between men and women was broken.
Usually the patriarch in a society is the father, husband, brother, or
son of a woman. These men protect, take care of, subjugate, and domi-
nate women, but these are also men with whom women have a primary
emotional, biological, and social attachment. The racial patriarchy fos-
ters another set of agendas, especially for women of color. The racial
patriarchy has no primary relationship with women of color and, there-
fore, no interest in protecting women of color. It has only an interest in
exploiting these women and their men. On the other hand, the white
women of the racial patriarch are held in place by both traditional patri-
archal power and by the seeming invincibility of men who exercise con-
trol over other men.
The earliest examples of manipulating women's reproductive capaci-
ties began in this country over two hundred years ago with slave mother-
ing. What happened to the fetus and infant of a slave mother? Who
owned it? If the mother claimed the child because she loved it, that claim
was invalid because the child wouldn't be profitable to the racial patri-
arch who owned it. If a black man fathered the child, he couldn't claim
patriarchal protection for that child or his woman because he had little
patriarchal power of his own.
With the advent of technologies which can control and manage bio-
logical reproduction, the racial patriarchy is able to extend and expand
its power over women. The technologies are an expansion of its direct
5. 2 W. HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 170 (1823); see
also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MAT=ER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESs-THE COLONIAL PERIOD 40-47 (1978).
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control over white middle and lower class women's reproductive choices,
with ominous implications for all women. Women may say, "I want to be
a surrogate mother, because I love children and I want to help these
infertile couples," but they do not see themselves caught in a more com-
prehensive plan.
The second aspect of my analysis is the universal urgency to
reproduce. All peoples have a racial urgency to reproduce themselves.
Every patriarch wants to reproduce the son. Every woman in every cul-
ture gets messages to become a mother and thereby support the desires of
the patriarch to reproduce. All cultures have tremendous penalties for
women who cannot mother. To be a woman is to mother. In most socie-
ties, women who can't have children are penalized and stigmatized. Wo-
men who are feminist still desire to mother, and feel lack and loss when
they haven't become mothers.
Ironically, black women are stigmatized by the racial patriarchy be-
cause they have too many babies. But their own men want them to have
their children-particularly their sons. There is a conflicting message to
women of color. The racial patriarchy gives them one message and
through social policies actively prevents women of color from taking care
of their children properly. Our men say: "Reproduce babies for the
nation."
The urgency to reproduce is intense and often irrational because it is
based solely on biological parenting. The social aspects of parenting are
often ignored. Adoption, a means of becoming social parents, is viewed
as a last resort of the desperate, rather than a socially acceptable expan-
sion of parenting.
The current urgency of the racial patriarch to reproduce is con-
nected to demographics and power. The birth rate of white people is de-
clining compared to the birth rates of people of color. White people are a
racial minority. Only a minority of that minority controls the world's
resources. There are about four billion people in the world. China has a
billion people, about one-fourth of the world's population. Over two-
thirds of the world's people live on the continents of Africa and Asia;
10.3% of the world's population lives in Africa. In the developed regions,
the population will grow at a 0.6% average rate until the year 2000; in
the underdeveloped world, it will grow at a rate of 2.1%, three times
faster. The racial patriarchs of today fear that there will not be enough
white males to whom they can pass the reins of power. The reproductive
choices of white women are critical to the biological reproduction of the
racial patriarch. Thus, the women's movement, with its emphasis upon
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reproductive choice and sexual freedom, threatens the very existence of
the racial patriarchy and white people. The universal racial urgency to
reproduce has been reinforced by the racial patriarchs' desire to control
white women's reproductive freedom and choices.
In addition to demographics undermining the international power of
white male rule, the women's movement and the civil rights movement
began to seriously challenge that power in this country about twenty
years ago. Underlying the social and political agendas of these move-
ments were demands for increased domestic spending for housing, child-
care, education, and health care, including abortion and prenatal care.
Since the rise of conservatism, the agenda has been pushed back, stifled
and contained, and replaced in part by an ideological and now biological
drive to increase the numbers of traditional nuclear white middle class
families, thereby enhancing the mass base of white male power.
The third concept I use in my analysis of reproductive technologies
is the conflict between biological reproduction and social reproduction.
The racial patriarch has placed biological reproduction at the top of the
list and, of course, that biological reproduction is of healthy white chil-
dren. At the same time, social reproduction of black and other children
of color is placed at the very bottom of the list. This is a source of tre-
mendous conflict. Resources are here, but children are starving over
there, literally malnourished. The research findings on prenatal care for
black women in Harlem are astounding. The prenatal death rates are
comparable with those of an undeveloped country. Yet, Harlem and
other communities exist in the middle of a highly developed country
where scientific knowledge can be used to do anything in the lab, where
the capacity to reproduce is daily being expanded. We have an imbalance
which leads to fundamental conflicts about the direction of our society,
especially the application of our scientific knowledge and technology.
The imbalance is linked to the increased underdevelopment of people of
color. Part of the increasing rate of unemployment of Hispanic and black
men is due to a shift from production to service jobs. Poor single mothers
cannot adequately care for their children because they lack adequate re-
sources. Poverty and unemployment among men and women of color are
directly related to social and political policies which undermine the de-
velopment of the black working class. However, the underdevelopment
of the black working class is tied directly to the reproduction and devel-
opment of the white middle class through reproductive technologies.
Audience: You seem pretty negative about alternative technologies.
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Do you see any value or virtue in these scientific methods which are
available for couples who want to have children?
Omolade: The concept of infertility is a social expansion of a biologi-
cal concept. As a social concept, it is linked with the patriarch's need to
reproduce and our universal biological-social constructions around re-
production. The couple who desires to have a child to raise and parent
has many sources of children available. They can have them biologically
or they can adopt children. The focus has been to define the couple who
cannot conceive a child as biologically infertile, and equate that with the
inability to be parents.
The difficulty of adopting children reinforces the concept of infertil-
ity. If adoption were an open relationship between the social and biologi-
cal parents administered by lawyers, doctors, and social workers who
were concerned about the well being of all parents and children, then the
patriarchal focus and construction of infertility would be eliminated. The
concept of infertility must be decoded to deconstruct the patriarchal
foothold and control of reproduction.
Rothman: I think you have to be cautious about victim-blaming. We
are looking at the individual couple getting caught in a very personal way
in this system. In fact, a white couple cannot get a black boarder baby
from the New York City hospitals. The system has decided that it is
better for a baby to learn to walk chained to a crib in Kings County than
to live in my house. So to those who say, "I have extra space and love
and room and would be glad to take on an extra child," we don't grant
access. We have to be careful not to blame the victims and put all of our
anger on the infertile people who feel caught in a system they didn't cre-
ate either.
Omolade: But changing attitudes and practices surrounding adop-
tion is a political decision which involves organizing for adoption, not for
the expansion of technologies which only support the concept of infertil-
ity. It is a question of political choice and construction of a political
response.
Hubbard: I think there is one other piece of this puzzle that has been
mentioned, but that needs to be put out front. That is eugenics, our focus
on genetic continuity and on good genes as opposed to bad genes. Eugen-
ics was an arrogant, quasi-aristocratic British invention. It was spelled
out by an upper class British gentleman, Francis Galton, a cousin of
Charles Darwin. He noted that occupations like being a judge or govern-
ment minister ran in families. Those, he noted, were the kinds of families
of which you want more. Similarly, he pointed out that pauperism, alco-
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holism, and prostitution ran in families. Society wants fewer of those peo-
ple. This placing of social values into our genes was taken up in the
United States with great enthusiasm. It fit the increasing nineteenth cen-
tury class, ethnic, racial, and gender divisions. Eugenics encouraged the
sense of need and urgency not just for white babies, but for good white
babies. As a society, we don't want nonwhite babies, and we want tech-
nology to tell us which of the white babies will be good enough to be
born.
Audience: At a certain point you can remove one of the embryos, do
a little genetic tinkering, and either implant it or freeze it. But it is all the
same person, all the cells have the same genetic material. If you identify
the embryo as a good one, it can be implanted in a number of women.
Hubbard: That is cloning. It can't be done yet. Here, I think, the
scientists are correct when they say, "Don't blame us." The technology is
not the problem. We need to be absolutely sure that the society won't
allow such a thing to become possible, not because it is technically im-
possible, but because we don't want it to happen. An amazing picture on
the cover of Science magazine showed a field of white cows, and penned
in a corner a bunch of brown cows. Over here was one white cow and
then lots and lots of white cows. These white cows were the genetic off-
spring of the one white mother. But they were gestated in the brown
mothers in the pen.
Omolade: There are black and white feminists who fear that the
wombs of women of color will be used to carry fetuses fertilized in vitro
for white women. I have a different position because I believe that white
working class women are the designated wombs and surrogate mothers
during this period. Many white and black feminists fail to recognize the
calculating nature of the racial patriarchy and its plans for control over
white working class women.
The design for controlling black women and black people is assum-
ing another direction. During this era of desegregation, the racial patri-
archy has promoted racism by describing and mystifying social policies
as economically, not racially, motivated. The use of women of color as
wombs would be viewed as racist and would sharpen the political con-
sciousness of people of color regarding racism at a time when political
consciousness is dulled. Moreover, racial practices in this country have
been moving toward personal distancing between black and white. Dur-
ing slavery, black women had sexual and intimate relations with whites,
but today both whites and blacks want to maintain distance.
Rothman: Events need to be put in the context of changing ideas
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about motherhood. A baby in a woman's body is not necessarily hers;
pregnancy doesn't make you a mother; pregnancy is not a relationship;
it's just housing.
I was on the Today show recently with some doctor talking about
transplanted embryos. He said that embryo transfers avoid any attach-
ment or bonding between surrogate mothers and the baby. His notion
was that the only relationship was a genetic relationship. Wet nursing
provides another good example. We took milk, turned it into a commod-
ity, and said nursing a baby is not a relationship with the baby. We can
measure and test the quality of milk. Then we either buy the milk di-
rectly or factor the cost of milk into the cost of a slave. There is not a
breast feeding relationship. There is a product we need. Eventually we
can make this product from cows and we can bottle it. The social rela-
tionship between women and their children can be removed and substi-
tuted with the marketable commodity of milk. I think we now are doing
the same thing with pregnancy by saying that you can take away the
relationship and the sense of attachment.
In my work on prenatal diagnosis, I observed women being told not
to establish a relationship with their fetus until they were told that the
fetus was a good one. This is part of a changing ideology which claims
that women are not connected to their babies, even the babies they
choose to carry to term. This opens the way for using yet cheaper labor.
Just walk on the streets and see who is pushing white babies in the park,
who is pushing white old people in wheelchairs. I find it very hard to
believe that those same people won't be carrying white babies in their
bellies.
Audience: It seems that, because of your fear of abuse, you are
throwing out a baby with the bathwater. I have an autistic son. I
wouldn't want another one. I feel that if I had another child, I certainly
would want to be prepared, or to know whether autism is a possibility.
Hubbard: I am glad you are saying this. If these resources are devel-
oped, they ought to be there for the people who need them. Now you will
say you didn't expect to have an autistic son the first time, so you didn't
know the technology would benefit you. That raises the question, does it
really make sense to medicalize every single act of procreation and gesta-
tion in order to try to avoid the rare instance of an event such as the one
you have experienced? That does not make sense. In fact, there is no way
to test for autism in utero. That's true for most disabilities because most
of them have complex origins that are different for different individuals.
It's a mistake to expect quick and easy fixes.
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Rothman: It isn't a technical problem. It is a social problem. The
solution is not controlling the technology. The issue is controlling the
society. We are not saying there are problems, so let's go bomb the labs.
We are saying we need some social responses and social justice because,
as technology gets more powerful, what an unjust society can do becomes
more terrifying.
Omolade: I think that the social control not simply of technology,
but of institutions, is very critical. Instead of our technology and institu-
tions being controlled by those with narrow interests in profit, they need
to be controlled by those who reflect and represent the broadest possible
interests of our population: poor people, people of color, women, the
handicapped, the elderly.
Most agree that technology should continue to sustain and improve
the quality of people's lives. Reproductive technology is problematic be-
cause it raises so many issues of rights and social control, but at the very
minimum, it must be optional. Today, pregnant women over forty years
of age are virtually forced to have amniocentesis, even though many wo-
men such as myself were willing to risk the consequences of birthing a
disabled child. We now have an abusive technology which is forced on
people who may have different cultural values and attitudes. Women
who have a different understanding than the medical profession of what
they want to do with their bodies and the children that come out of their
bodies are not listened to or respected. There is a medicalization of preg-
nancy and childbirth which undermines women's choices, cultures, and
values. Poor women, especially those on Medicaid, often find that they
and their children are victims of experimentation during pregnancy and
childbirth. There must be limits and guidelines for genetic experimenta-
tion and the uses of reproductive technology because we live in a society
with a long history of interference and manipulation of women's repro-
ductive activity in the name of racism and sexism.
Hubbard: The economics of the situation mean that poor women,
women of color, are the ones having very low birth weight babies who
are at much greater risk for disabilities. Yet, prenatal technologies are
being focused on the precious babies of the people who can pay to avoid
what may be major, but what often are quite minor, disabilities compared
to those happening to the babies of poor women. It would be easy to
prevent many infants being born ill or disabled by feeding and caring for
women before and during pregnancy. We know how to do it. We just
don't.
Rothman: The belief that prenatal diagnosis is used only so that
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wealthy people can have perfect babies is not accurate. These technolo-
gies are pushed on women who would be dependent upon public assistant
for care of those children. I heard genetic counselors planning to lobby in
Albany, saying the argument they used for opening more publicly funded
genetic counseling centers is that every terminated sickle cell pregnancy
saves the state $20,000 per year.
Audience: Traditionally our society divides between home caretak-
ing and income making responsibilities. Do you think that the separation
of women from motherhood and the changes in the relationship between
mother and child are necessary for professional women to gain a proper
place in the workplace? Perhaps some women see themselves needing a
separation.
Omolade: There have always been surrogate mothers in this society.
Slaveholders' wives were helped by black women. During most of the
twentieth century, domestic workers have reared the children of profes-
sional women.
Audience: My point is that the same traditional line of segregation
between home caretaking and income making is still continued. But wo-
men are now having a choice. Segregation in terms of sex may be some-
what breaking down.
Rothman: Exactly. One of the thrusts of the women's movement
was to to make space for women who want to live like men. One of the
thrusts in the development of the technology has been to reaffirm wo-
men's paternity rights, so that if Mary's seed grows to term in Susan's
body, we will still put on the birth certificate the name of the seed parent,
Mary, and not the gestator, Susan. There are birth certificates in America
that have, under mother, the egg donor and not the woman who was
pregnant. We act as if the genetic tie that men have is the most profound
possible tie in reproduction, and that women's reproductive experience
can be split between our seed and our gestation. In that sense it is our
paternity rights or our seed rights that need to be maintained. We do this
in the name of fairness, and like the Supreme Court ruling on pregnancy
discrimination, say it's not discrimination against women because women
who act like men don't face discrimination.6 It is only women (or men)
who want to act like women who face discrimination.
6. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). The Court held that a state insurance program
which failed to provide health benefits for pregnant women was not in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment because "[t]he program divides potential recipients into two
groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the
second includes members of both sexes." Id. at 496-97 n.20.
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Audience: It is apparent that the development of these technologies
makes possible the further, more explicit, commodification of gestation.
Clearly, gestation occurred in an economic context as labor that was re-
ceiving limited compensation before the development of these technolo-
gies. What is your sense of how the relative social value of the work of
gestation has changed?
Rothman: First, I don't see the technologies creating the ideology.
The ideology promotes the development of certain kinds of technology.
If we start with a different way of thinking, we would have clearly differ-
ent solutions.
Consider the case of two people who are carriers for something
dreadful, like Tay Sachs disease, which gives you six months of normal,
delightful, cheerful development and then a very long period of dying. If
both parents have the potential for Tay Sachs, these people desperately
need prenatal diagnosis. I have interviewed women who have gone
through a pregnancy, prenatal diagnosis, abortion, and absolutely hor-
rendous grief, and then faced a second pregnancy. The question was, how
could this couple have a healthy baby? The answer was, by prenatal diag-
nosis. I would have asked the question, how can this woman have a
healthy baby, for this couple to raise as parents? My answer would be,
artificial insemination. That answer is not often the one chosen. So the
kind of ideology you have determines the way you phrase the question.
How can this man and this woman make together, genetically, a baby
that is theirs? This gives you one set of solutions and develops one kind
of technology. The question, how can this couple have a baby socially,
even with a biological pregnancy, and produce a baby that is theirs, gives
you another option. As new technology develops, we will probably see
egg donations for Tay Sachs. It will be his sperm with its Tay Sachs
potential but not her egg. Egg donation rather than sperm donation is
expensive, more physically dangerous, more painful, with a lower success
rate, but his paternity will be maintained and her gestational tie will be
maintained. It will be another alternative for a couple, but it comes from
a certain kind of ideology. It is not the technology that creates the ideol-
ogy; but the ideology clearly creates the technology.
We already have the notion that women bear babies for somebody:
for the state, for men, for slave owners, for somebody. That idea was
always there. Women were differentially rewarded depending on who
wanted the baby and for what purpose. If you desperately wanted a lot of
babies in a big hurry for cannon fodder, you increased the reward such as
giving women more services. If you wanted a son for the throne, you
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rewarded that woman royally. If you didn't want her to have any babies,
you starved her. The rewards are dependent upon how badly you want
that woman's baby out of her body.
Audience: I am interested in the immediate acceptance of the deval-
uation of motherhood. It seems that the media plays a large part in legiti-
mizing the commodification of motherhood. Are there studies on the role
of the media?
Rothman: I teach a class on motherhood at the CUNY Graduate
Center. We look at magazines over the last thirty years to find articles on
aspects of mothering. Something happened around 1974 in American
magazines. Articles on bad mothering prior to 1974 focused on overpro-
tection, on the smothering mother. The post-1974 articles are on abusive
and abandoning mothers. I don't think we stopped smothering and
started beating our children in 1974. But the image of where we were
erring changed. I think the media helps to create these images. Media
constructs reality in the very language it gives us to talk about these is-
sues. The media language in the Baby M case, the phrase Baby M rather
than Sarah, her mother's name for her, gives it away. The media has used
such terms as natural fathers and surrogate mothers as well as the term
surrogate parenthood-a term created to make the issue gender neutral.
Omolade: We must all be careful not to generalize about these is-
sues. The particular focus of articles about mothering during the 1940s
and '70s are the practices of white middle class mothers. Black and other
mothers of color have been excluded from those popular magazines.
During the late '30s and early '40s we begin to get the first scholarly
studies of the black family and black people by mainstream white and
black sociologists, although W.E.B. DuBois wrote one of the earliest
studies on the black family at the turn of the century. During and after
the civil rights movement, a whole literature began to develop, focusing
on the culture of poverty analysis of black family life. One major point
was the negative impact of black mothers on their children. Most black
and white social scientists have assumed that, because black people are
poor and were slaves, their parenting is pathological. But research orga-
nizations such as the Urban League have consistently documented the
success of poor black families in raising children who are successful.
But the mass media and social science research continue to portray
the black family in negative terms. Bill Moyers produced a television
special, The Vanishing Black Family, which portrayed three families
headed by women. The show was an attacking, negative, blaming of
black women and their families and their personal choices. Social scien-
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tists will continue to use those shows as a reference point for their re-
search and not do the hard work of examining the lives of black women
and men.
Audience: A further question that emerges is, what are the psycho-
logical consequences across generations of having this extraordinarily
complicated relationship with your body? Much of this discussion re-
volves around motherhood as the battleground for the social construc-
tion of identity for women.
Rothman: Because the focus is on where the sperm will go, on genet-
ics. Women's bodies are one place to grow sperm. Women become just
one place where sperm can be grown.
Hubbard: In a medical journal article, the authors state that it is
sometimes less safe to transport a fragile, sick newborn than to move the
fetus in situ, which means to move the pregnant woman. In this con-
struct, the mother is erased as a person and exists merely as the location
of the vulnerable fetus.
Rothman: When we look at sonograms of fetuses, the image in our
minds of women becomes empty space. We see fetuses floating. The fetus
is there. It is real. The woman is the invisible environment.
Audience: Seeing a baby in utero is absolutely fantastic. For a while
we see the fetus as fetus, but a time will come when fetus and mother will
unite and we'll think of pregnant women.
Rothman: I'm not sure that's correct. This technology didn't land
from Mars. Doctors had been hunting for a way to get mothers out of the
way so that they could get to the fetus physically and visually without
the barriers that the woman represented to them. Technology was made
for the purpose. They looked for it. The technology serves to reify the
ideology.
Audience: I wanted to get back to some of the class issues that we
raised before. A naive economist's view of what has happened over the
last fifty years might run like this. The workforce has opened up to wo-
men. Women have more opportunities to make money in the labor mar-
ket. That means the opportunity costs of gestation and nurturing are
higher. We should have pushed the economic reward for gestation and
nurturing up. As women go into the workforce, fewer of them are avail-
able to fulfill men's imperative to reproduce themselves. Though the
compensation should be higher rather than lower, that has not been
happening.
Rothman: Opportunity for women increased in a race and class spe-
cific way, which meant that you could then continue to have cheap labor
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by moving down. It is not that the opportunities for women increased,
but rather that women are now bifurcated in their opportunities.
Audience: Are you saying that opportunities for women from high
social class backgrounds have diversified and the compensation available
to them for childrearing and childbearing has increased so that their ba-
bies have increased in value, but the total number of jobs and opportuni-
ties for employment hasn't increased? As opportunities for socially well-
off women have increased, opportunities for socially not-very-well-off
men have decreased. Their ability to compensate women for bearing their
children is decreased, with the result that the social payoff for poor wo-
men in bearing children has decreased.
Rothman: Or if you want to take a more conspiratorial view of the
whole thing, men use women. Men use women to have their children.
But it has become very costly to use your wife for all purposes, so what
you need are several surrogate wives: one wife to bring in a second in-
come and to be a social asset, one wife to rear your children, and yet
another to clean the bathroom. If the wife who is the social asset doesn't
have a functioning uterus, then you need yet another temporary wife for
childbearing. In a patriarchy, all these women, housekeepers, baby
nurses, and women working in day care centers, are surrogate wives rais-
ing men's children, although women may not experience it in this
manner.
Omolade: A multiplicity of surrogate wives has always served the
racial patriarchy. That has been the social arrangement from the begin-
ning. It is not men using women. It is a very specific group of men, who
have state and economic power to control and command the organiza-
tion of surrogate wives.
Audience: What are some of the ideological barriers to adoption?
Omolade: There is a supposed shortage of good babies. Adoption
agencies have said that one is more likely to get a child of color, an older
child, or a handicapped child. There are also prohibitions against adop-
tion by older couples, single adults, gay and lesbian couples, and adults
who differ racially and ethnically from the child. There is also the ideol-
ogy of a good child, meaning a child of one's own, a child from the sperm
of your married mate and from your own body, a child that looks like
you.
It is not only marketing. All men want a child of their own to reflect
their biological inheritance. Black and other men of color have great con-
cerns about infertility. But infertility is thought to be a white middle class
issue and that's where the concern is focused. Wealthy men have found a
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way to resolve the infertility issue-financing reproductive technology.
Black men often say their manhood is reflected in having a child. In fact,
all cultures worldwide emphasize the connection between manhood and
reproduction, between motherhood and birthing.
Hubbard: There is an interesting contradiction hidden in this too.
There is evidence that genetic confusion among adoptees is very hard on
them. The revolution in adoption with open adoptions, and being frank
about genetic origins and social parentage, is a response. At the same
time that one population is advocating openness, another population is
talking about donor insemination and wanting to keep it anonymous. For
example, the American Fertility Society still advises keeping the identity
of sperm donors anonymous. Similarly, with so-called surrogate mother-
hood and the issues around Baby M, there is the question what she is
going to be told about who is what. Although there is a lot of information
about what people who have different genetic and social parents want to
know about their origins, our society continues to insist that a child must
have only two parents.
Audience: Do we know how people regard psychologically a father
whose wife has been inseminated by another man, or the mother's
response?
Hubbard: There is getting to be a literature on adoption, but there is
very little interview material on children who result from artificial insem-
ination. Because it usually has been kept secret, there is no population to
study.
Omolade: We don't have the social capacities yet for dealing with
these complex issues well, efficiently, and humanely. Notions of how you
love children, how you take care of them, how you respond to their car-
ing, are very underdeveloped in our society.
II. AFRNOON SESSION: THE LEGAL ISSUES
Isabel Marcus: This afternoon we will explore some of the legal im-
plications of alternative reproductive technologies. Rhonda Copelon
from the City University of New York Law School and I, Isabel Marcus
from the SUNY-Buffalo Law faculty, will be joining our other
conversants.
To establish a framework, it is important to review the contributions
of the reproductive rights movement during the past fifteen years. The
movement identified the separation of sex from reproduction as a signifi-
cant development for the status of women. It focused on the right to be
sexual as a human experience, independent from reproduction or family.
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It articulated a vision of reordered relationships between women and
men. It challenged the prevailing ideology of patriarchy which reinforces
the existing sex-gender systems.
Rhonda Copelon: There is no question that one of the goals of the
reproductive rights movement was to separate sex from reproduction to
help liberate women's sexuality. Proponents of the criminalization of
contraception like Anthony Comstock fully intended that women should
engage in nonmarital, nonreproductive sex under a cloud of potential
pregnancy. This included the risk of abusive, back alley abortions, Flo-
rence Crittenden homes for unwed mothers, societally coerced adoption,
shotgun marriages, and the social stigma and legal disabilities of illegiti-
macy. Twentieth century women concerned with reproductive rights
challenged the stereotype of female sexual passivity by claiming the right
to express desire, to initiate sexual relationships, and to enjoy casual as
well as serious relationships. This was a substantial shift from the nine-
teenth century feminist position which opposed contraception and advo-
cated abstinence as a means of containing male and protecting female
sexuality.
Agitation for legal abortion was begun by doctors facing criminal
charges, family planners advocating control over childbearing,
eugenicists complaining of overpopulation and disproportionate
childbearing among the poor, and social justice advocates concerned
with the toll of criminal abortion on poor women's lives and health.
Although feminists like Catherine Roreback and Tom Emerson, who
framed the Griswold' strategy, were involved in these mid-twentieth cen-
tury efforts, it was not until the second wave of the feminist movement
coalesced in the late 1960s that the necessity of reproductive control to
women's ability to live full and healthy lives took center stage. The in-
volvement of feminists transformed the opposition to criminal abortion
from a medical-social reform effort into a human rights struggle. The
recognition in Roe v. Wade8 of the right to decide whether to bear a child
is a significant accomplishment, but that right is qualified by deference to
medical judgment, claims on behalf of the fetus, a libertarian insistence
on individual private responsibility, and ultimately by the Court's manip-
ulation of access to abortion through its refusal to require Medicaid
funding.9 We will return to the impact of these concerns on reproductive
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the first case to recognize a right of privacy
extending to contraceptive use for married couples).
8. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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technologies.
A number of elements were essential to feminist advocacy. In the
original slogan, "free abortion on demand," feminists challenged the sub-
ordination of women to law and medicine and demanded affirmative
state support to guarantee universal access. Concepts such as "our bod-
ies, our lives" embraced the challenge to the sexual double standard as
well as to the traditional subservient role of women.
Although antagonism to women's sexual freedom is clearly the leit-
motif of the attack on abortion, the reproductive rights argument for wo-
men's sexual freedom has taken a backseat to the family planning
perspective. I believe this development is a consequence of feminist am-
bivalence about sexuality as well as the tendency to mainstream the abor-
tion issue.
Marcus: I am of two minds regarding the impact of the contracep-
tion and abortion cases on the reordering of sexual relationships between
women and men. Let's look at access to contraception first. On one hand,
many women have clearly benefited from access to contraception. The
shift in the birth rate reflects in part the availability of contraception,
purchased by women for themselves and for male partners. The latest
statistics, which admittedly may be influenced by the concern over AIDS
and other genitally transmitted diseases, reveal that women purchase
forty percent of all the condoms sold in the United States.
Whether women experience access to contraception as a way of re-
ordering relationships with men is less apparent. Women are now more
readily available to men. Is sex without the risk of pregnancy the ulti-
mate realization of male fantasy? Does this possibility of access to sex
without pregnancy give women the confidence to make demands on their
male partners? Or to want more partners?
Copelon: There is a significant difference between removing a nega-
tive barrier to sexuality and creating an environment which fosters af-
firmative expression and enjoyment of sex. Decriminalization affects, but
does not eradicate or transform, the traditional construction of hetero-
sexual sexuality. If changes have occurred, and I think they have, they
are a consequence not simply of legal change, but also of cultural change
interacting with feminist demands. While women must still tread a
course between pleasure and danger, the feminist insistence on sexual
freedom as a right has helped build women's sense of entitlement to seek
sexual pleasure, and decriminalization has mitigated the disastrous con-
sequences and shame of sexual exploration.
The flourishing of lesbian sexuality is also a critical consequence of
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the demand for the separation of sex and reproduction. In spite of the
continued absence of federal constitutional protection, the emergence of
a lesbian-gay movement insistent on legal recognition directly and indi-
rectly alters the relationship between men and women. It opens the possi-
bility of sexual and intimate lives that reflect a celebration of women's
sexuality and do not depend on mediating the gender gap. The editors of
Powers of Desire also make the important point that lesbian sexuality
benefits heterosexual women because it remains an option for them that
men must take into account."0 Indeed, we cannot underestimate how
deeply threatening, and therefore important, the idea of separating sex
and reproduction is to challenging the sex-gender system. This was re-
flected in the Court's refusal to recognize sexual pleasure as a human
right in Bowers v. Hardwick, a case in which a gay man challenged the
criminalization of sodomy." This decision serves to contain women's
and gay sexuality. It also raises serious questions about the rights of sin-
gle women, lesbians, and gay men to form and maintain parental rela-
tionships with children. These questions are reflected in negative
decisions on custody, foster care, and adoption, and in decisions about
access and parental status involving reproductive technologies.
Marcus: Now let's turn to the impact of the abortion cases on the
reordering of relationships between women and men. In the initial abor-
tion decisions, the Court made it clear that the doctor-patient decision
could not be compromised by a spouse, lover, or casual acquaintance. In
that sense, the decisions appeared to lead to, or at least facilitate, the
reordering of relationships between women and men. Women could have
sex without fear of having to carry an unwanted child to term. If contra-
ception failed or was unavailable, safe legal abortion was the backup.
But the same questions I raised about contraception and the reor-
dering of relationships apply to abortion. What is the relationship be-
tween a qualitatively different access to sex and the change in
relationships between the sexes? We may have assumed rather ingenu-
ously that reproductive rights decisions involving abortion would trans-
form our relationships with men.
Copelon: Again, this is a hard and important question and, as some-
one who has spent the most significant part of my work as a constitu-
tional litigator, I may overestimate the transformative effects of legal
change. With that caveat, I think it does make a difference that a woman
10. A. SNITow, C. STANSELL & S. THOMPSON, PowERs OF DESIRE: THE POLmIcs OF SEXU-
ALITY 34 (1983).
11. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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knows she is entitled to make an independent decision about abortion
and even that she is entitled to do it secretly-without her husband or
lover knowing. Even Carol Gilligan's study on abortion decision mak-
ing,12 which was supposed to demonstrate the interconnectedness rather
than individualism of women's decision making, emphasized the signifi-
cance of the moment when a woman started to see her own needs as
legitimate rather than understand them as derivative of the needs or
desires of other family members.
Despite legal entitlement, women can be subordinated. Men exert
tremendous influence and sometimes coercion in the decision-making
process. When a husband says, you can't have an abortion or, if you have
the baby, he'll do no more than put up with it, or he'll leave, those state-
ments can coerce a woman's decision just as violence can and does. But
even under the worst circumstances, women do exercise agency in the
sense of asserting their own needs. I have helped battered women get
secret abortions when they thought they'd be killed for it. For one wo-
man with whom I have kept in contact, the abortion was an act of sur-
vival and self-assertion that probably began the process of getting out of
the relationship. It made a difference that she didn't have to go under-
ground for the abortion or answer questions in the doctor's office about
whether she had told her lover or whether he agreed. So there has been a
symbolic as well as practical effect, although it is a small piece of a larger
puzzle of subordination and agency.
Rothman: Some of the talk about abortion needs to be reconsidered.
Most American support for abortion has nothing to do with women's
control of their own bodies. American support for abortion has always
been eugenic support for abortion. Americans want certain kinds of fe-
tuses not to come to term, and that has to do specifically with genetic
disease and poor women's babies. The overwhelming majority of Ameri-
cans strongly support having abortion available, but not on feminist
grounds.
It is wrong to assume that access to abortions is always a feminist
issue, that women want access to abortions and that men and the state
apply pressure to have babies. When you look at the period in which
there was small growth in the Anglo population, it was upwardly mobile
men who pressured their wives not to get pregnant and to have abortions.
It wasn't women who wanted abortions to free themselves. It was the
state needing different kinds of children.
12. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVEL-
OPMENT (1982).
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Copelon: I think we should be troubled, Barbara, by oversimplifica-
tion of one position or another. You can argue that the mid-nineteenth
century rise in abortion among the married, bourgeois, and upper classes
had in part to do with men's desires to be upwardly mobile and restrict
expenses to accumulate or preserve wealth. But to say that middle class
women's aspirations for a fuller life or working class women's needs to
limit childbearing to continue working were not significant factors in the
rising abortion rate vitiates women's agency in history.13
Similarly, there is no question that the right to abortion was sought
by non-feminist and anti-feminist interests as well as feminists, and that
polls show greater support for rape and incest and eugenic abortions than
for women's choice. But, just as it is critical to grapple with the weak-
nesses and contradictions in the support for abortion, it is important to
recognize the progress that the feminist position has made. Indeed, as a
consequence of feminist insistence on abortion as a woman's right, the
Court has abandoned the Roe v. Wade position that the decision is pri-
marily the doctor's. It now recognizes, albeit by a smaller majority, that
the ability to make this decision is essential to women's equal citizen-
ship. 4 However, we are still leagues from guaranteeing universal and
unqualified access to abortion, and from creating a society and laws that
assure all women of real procreative choice.
Marcus: This is a good moment to focus on the relationship between
gender and reproductive technologies. If I have doubts that the availabil-
ity of contraception and abortion has resulted in the transformation of
relationships between women and men, I have even stronger doubts that
alternative reproductive technologies contain such a transformative
potential.
For example, the terms we use in talking about alternative reproduc-
tive technologies rely on the socially constructed categories of male and
female, father and mother. The focal point has an almost essentialist
quality to it. You are your biology-ova and uterus or sperm. While fem-
inists seeking the reordering of relationships are concerned that women
and men are not simply their biology, the new reproductive technologies
may push us back into those very categories as the definition of our entire
being. In this sense, progress may play a very cruel joke on us. We will
be the categories that we fought against as our primary identification. As
13. L. GORDON, WOMEN'S BODY; WOMEN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL
IN AMERICA (1977).
14. Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772
(1986).
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Barbara Katz Rothman suggested this morning, the ultimate females
may become mother machines.
Another limit on the transformative potential of the new reproduc-
tive technologies is that they tend to reify genetics and family ties. One
aspect of the liberating potential connected with sexuality and reproduc-
tion for the women's movement was the recognition that genetic and
conventional nuclear family ties were not necessarily the most important
and most significant ties. Other bases for connection between and among
people could be acknowledged as valuable. The new reproductive tech-
nologies focus on male and female genetic material placed in some
female.
Copelon: I share your ambivalence and caution about the dangers of
reproductive technologies, not because they create these problems but
because they have the potential to reaffirm them. But I don't think we
should ignore the progressive possibilities. To the extent that reproduc-
tive technologies break the connection between the traditional heterosex-
ual family and reproduction, they have progressive possibilities. The
increasing acceptance of donor insemination, for example, has made
childbearing more accessible to women, whether lesbian or straight, who
do not want to condition parenting on the participation of a male part-
ner. At the same time, extension of donor insemination has drawn criti-
cism from commissions and ethicists who decry insemination outside of
marriage. Some sperm banks limit eligibility to the married and many
state laws still protect only the rights of married couples.
The impediments to access by nontraditional people are not simply
formal, however. Although informal arrangements for donor insemina-
tion cannot be regulated by the state, it is not necessarily easy for women
to find willing donors. AIDS has disqualified or discouraged many gay
men from being donors and heterosexual men or couples have far greater
difficulty being donors, largely because it requires a willingness to aban-
don the traditional connection between reproduction and sexuality and
loosen the boundaries of the nuclear family. I do not mean to suggest
that the question of whether to assist another person to reproduce should
be taken lightly. But I have been stunned by the tenacity of heterosexism,
which values the nuclear heterosexual model as superior, in the value
systems of even the most progressive people.
In other words, the limitations of the reproductive technologies can-
not be primarily ascribed to rules and regulations "out there." They
flow from unexamined premises and stereotypes that influence even those
who consider themselves feminist. It is not surprising that courts have
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upheld the claims of known donors to fatherhood status over women's
efforts to form alternative families, essentially because it is considered
desirable to assure that children have a father for support and social
acceptability. 15
I am optimistic, however, that we will see changes. Many women,
particularly lesbians, are having children through donor insemination
and forming alternative families notwithstanding these barriers and risks.
On the other hand, where medical technology is required to assist repro-
duction, it presents a new opportunity to define who is eligible to
reproduce. This boils down to financial and heterosexual privilege.
Hubbard: I don't see technology as the problem. The values to
which the society adheres are the driving force, though what we call the
medical-industrial complex has a serious impact on this too. Technolo-
gies which aren't necessarily high tech have the potential for opening up
reproductive possibilities. But white, middle class, heterosexual couples
have the most access to them. You've got to be wealthy enough to pay a
lot of money to doctors. You are not acceptable in many places, not by
virtue of state statutes which limit what doctors can do, but by virtue of
hospital rules that say we won't deal with single women or we won't deal
with somebody over forty years old. Or you may raise troubling issues
like the disability rights groups do. Our society, with its eugenic ideol-
ogy, has kept these groups out of discussions about prenatal screening
designed to prevent disabled babies from being born. Thus it is essential
that, at the same time we critique and oppose certain technologies and
their abuse of women, we fight for inclusion of those who don't fit the
proper norm-those who are single, who are poor, who are of color, or
who don't fit the mold of traditional family. It is a very serious problem,
but it is not the technology but the culture that creates it.
Marcus: How do reproductive technologies affect our concept of wo-
men and pregnancy? Do they exacerbate a range of ideological tensions
regarding the status of women?
Copelon: Like other questions about ideology, the two you pose re-
quire complex answers. On the one hand, reproductive technology may
increase the tendency to treat women as fertility vessels. This tendency is
15. See C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977). In this case a donative father,
who was aquainted with the mother, was granted visitation rights because the court found that it was
in the best interest of the child to have two parents, even though the mother utilized artificial insemi-
nation for the purpose of becoming a single parent. See also Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App.
3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986). Factually similar to CM. v. CC., this case upheld the trial courts
decision to grant the donative father legal paternity despite the mother's intention to raise the child
with a female friend.
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fed by the age-old male desire to wrest control over reproduction from
women. It is reinforced by fertility specialists who don't give women full
information on the risks and benefits of elaborate and experimental ther-
apies. On the other hand, undoubtedly in response to the fear of dehu-
manization, feminists as well as sexual and moral conservatives have
reasserted the maternal essentialist position. When we oppose surrogacy,
for example, on the ground that the maternal bond is sacred and no wo-
man in her right mind could knowingly and voluntarily undertake to
bear a child for another, at least when she receives a fee, I worry that we
are both denying the multiplicity of women's experience and acceding to
being defined by our reproductive function.
I think it is critical for feminists to find a path through these two
thickets. We are not going to stop reproductive technologies. The de-
mand, which comes from women as well as men, is too great, although
much of that demand would be avoidable by major public health initia-
tives to prevent infertility and infant morality. It is critical that feminists
work to preserve the integrity of women who choose to use reproductive
technologies and to ensure opportunities for nontraditional childbearing.
Omolade: I find a parallel between the experience of the women's
movement and the civil rights movement. For both, their court victories
carried within them the seed of backlash. All the issues you raised about
Roe v. Wade were built into the Brown v. Board 6 desegregation decision.
The basis of the argument was that all-black institutions were separate,
unequal, and inherently inferior. While the decision was supposed to em-
power black people by declaring the injustice of segregation, it also has
given support to the mistaken perspective that all-black institutions are
inferior, even though much of their problem is the economic one of un-
derfinancing. Civil rights advocates view Brown as a real breakthrough.
It ended legal segregation, but it also underminded the success and exist-
ence of all-black institutions.
In what ways can such knowledge of the limitations of our court
victories inform the new strategies evolving around reproductive technol-
ogy? Can the law be used in a progressive, self-determining way?
Marcus: To address that question we may need to begin with a dis-
cussion of whether the rights analysis which has often been identified
with progressive self-determination in law is useful and desirable in the
context of the new reproductive technologies.
Copelon: We have to continue to shape the rights analysis to protect
16. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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women from reproductive abuse at the same time as we recognize limita-
tions in the existing framework of reproductive rights and work to cor-
rect them. The deficiencies flow less from the notion of rights than from
the values that shape their contours and context.
Let's look first at some of the things that are useful in rights analy-
sis. The recognition in Eisenstadt v. Baird7 that the married couple is not
a unit, but two separate and independent individuals, can be used to
guarantee individual procreative rights outside marriage. Similarly, the
Eisenstadt ruling that a husband cannot accomplish his procreative pur-
pose by forcing his wife to continue a pregnancy provides an important
foundation for women's reproductive autonomy, a foundation which un-
derlies the analysis whether the beneficiary be a spouse, contractor, or
the state. It is based on the broader principle that a person cannot
subordinate the body or labor of another to his own ends. This principle
should preclude enforcement of surrogacy contract provisions to forego
abortion, follow certain prenatal regimes, or turn over a child against
one's will. All precedents are under attack today and their survival de-
pends on the degree to which we can convince this nation and its courts
that the subordination of women is unacceptable in itself and in its conse-
quences for everyone.
Marcus: However, there are deficiencies in rights analysis and, when
rights analysis is applied to reproductive technologies, troubling issues
emerge.
Copelon: I agree. For example, the recognition in Roe v. Wade that
the viable fetus is a permissible constraint on a woman's reproductive
autonomy 8 can create a legal basis for interventions on behalf of the
fetus. This approach has been used to justify forced caesarian section;
approximately eighty percent of these cases involve women of color. This
is only a prelude to other prenatal interventions, presumably to benefit
the fetus. 9 Both men and women will potentially lose control to science
if protection or perfection of the fetus becomes a permissible basis for
medical bodily intervention against a woman's will. The alleged protec-
tion of potential human life could become the vehicle for dangerous eu-
17. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
18. In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that after viability the state can prefer the preservation of
fetal life, except when doing so would threaten the health or life of the pregnant woman. 410 U.S. at
163-164.
19. See Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions" What's Wrong With Fetal Rights, 10
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1987).
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genic experimentation unless a pregnant woman is constitutionally
entitled to say no.
Marcus: You are quite correct. A fetus conceived through reproduc-
tive technology may be accorded protection through rights, especially if
gestating and producing the perfect or, as Barbara Katz Rothman sug-
gests, the precious baby is the goal. Preciousness may have a range of
legal consequences we have barely begun to anticipate or explore. More-
over, high technology may reinforce trends toward the medicalization of
reproduction. Conception and gestation will become a multistage process
supervised by doctors and scientists.
Copelon: The medicalization of reproduction has consequences for
rights analysis. I worry that improved embryo transplant technology
could lead to the conversion of early abortion into embryo transplant,
irrespective of the woman's consent. Here, the right to control whether
one's genetic child is brought into the world becomes significant. I am
concerned about the preoccupation with genetics that comes from using
reproductive technologies as alternatives to adoption, although I don't
think that it's fair to single out those who struggle with biological infer-
tility for blame. Everyone needs to work to build a culture of reproduc-
tive generosity, which means volunteering to share one's reproductive
capacity. But I also think that it is necessary to retain the power to with-
hold our gametes or fetuses if we are to limit state or commercial control.
On the other hand, if recognition of a relationship with a child is
based only on genetic or gestational ties, or on being denominated a par-
ent, then we have done little to reshape the structure of social infertility
that Barbara Omolade identified this morning as far more significant
than biological infertility.
Marcus: A further twist to the argument concerns the right to pri-
vacy. Reliance on a right to privacy, a recognition of individual control,
has disparate consequences for different classes.
Copelon: The constitutional notion of privacy is individualistic and
negative. It is inadequate to the dual tasks of assuring procreative choice
and preventing procreative incapacity. The Medicaid abortion cases ex-
emplify the problem. They define procreative liberty only as the right to
be free of state-created barriers, not to be free of state manipulation and
discrimination, not to be entitled to call upon the state to guarantee
meaningful access through subsidization. Even though some poor women
will find it impossible to secure abortions and consequently will suffer
health- and even life-endangering risks, the Court has held that the ex-
clusion of abortion coverage from Medicaid does not infringe the right of
[Vol. 37
LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE:
privacy. These decisions legitimate the power of the state to manipulate
procreative decisions of poor women for demographic or ideological rea-
sons. If this is the case, there is no reason to believe that poor women,
who suffer much greater levels of biological infertility, will obtain access
to reproductive technologies through litigation. Access is a privilege that
depends entirely on majoritarian bias and resources.
From a broader perspective, it is unacceptable that a negative right
of privacy exempt the state from responsibility to protect or facilitate
procreation. We know, for example, that biological infertility is largely
preventable through better health care and reducing toxicity in the envi-
ronment and workplace. Effective early detection of sexually transmitted
disease would contribute significantly to reducing infertility. But without
a positive concept of rights or reproductive liberty, we cannot invoke the
constitution to insist that the state provide even this simple, affirmative
protection.
Omolade: The social context shapes and defines the implementation
of rights. The civil rights issue provides a perfect illustration. We can
identify institutional racism as a problem and eliminate it legally, but the
person who can't get a job is still poor and black. That person has a right
to work but has no right to claim that she is being institutionally limited
by the economy, the society, or the law because there are no legal restric-
tions. There is only racism and the emergence of new forms of
containment.
Copelon: The constitution ought to be a vehicle not only to protect
individual action but to insist on affirmative state policies. This perspec-
tive transcends the narrow concept of rights that the Court has quite
deliberately embraced.
Audience: It seems to me that the thirteenth amendment is ex-
tremely relevant both as a limitation on capital and as a definition of
rights. It says you cannot sell other people. In fact, it obliterated property
in other people. Black people who were slaves were worth six million
dollars one day and the next day they weren't worth anything to anyone
but themselves. A radical tradition of rights may have gotten lost in the
late nineteenth century reinterpretation of rights as a commercial enter-
prise. That radical tradition is about autonomy and, as expressed in the
thirteenth amendment, about the right to control the use of one's body.
The Baby M case20 is about the selling of a person. What is so threaten-
20. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). The Baby M case was decided between
the time of this symposium and publication. The trial court's termination of the biological mother's
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ing to the social order is that such situations open the doors to the
purchase of human beings in a market in which there is a big demand.
Actually, I was just going to emphasize that the Baby M case is not
so much the selling of the baby as the renting of the mother's body. Very
shortly after the passage of the thirteenth amendment, the notion that a
person could sell or rent a portion of themselves in the form of services
became the defining feature of freedom.
Copelon: I also find the thirteenth amendment relevant to the surro-
gacy context, but perhaps for different reasons. For the state or any indi-
vidual to deny a woman access to abortion is to make pregnancy a form
of involuntary servitude. Conversely, the purchase of an unwilling wo-
man to bear and bestow a child violates the principle of the thirteenth
amendment that people cannot be required to serve against their will,
contracts notwithstanding. I hesitate to say that the thirteenth amend-
ment applies if a woman undertakes this willingly, but it is clear to me
that the so-called surrogacy contracts have to be unenforceable in light of
the thirteenth amendment and the equitable principles that it embodies.
Some argue that the thirteenth amendment applies only while a wo-
man is pregnant, but that her service after the child is born is no longer
being exacted. I am aware of the trap of maternal essentialism and I
recognize that some women are able to give up a child without extended
trauma, but the woman who has changed her mind finds it impossible to
think of the newborn as suddenly separate from the gestational process.
Nor do I think that a woman's service ends with childbirth. In the case of
surrogacy, the service is a profound act of will to renounce all parental
rights and relationship and confer them on another. To enforce such a
promise would reduce a woman to the object of someone else's desire and
divest her of entitlement to respect for her will and identity, which is one
of the central evils of slavery.
Audience: I think there is confusion when we look at the mother
because there is prostitution and wage labor, both of which are forms of
alienating capacities. I'm talking about the baby. If you write laws that
absolutely prohibit any exchange of money in connection with surrogacy
on the grounds that it involved the purchase of another human being,
you would turn it into something else. It would become a different
institution.
Copelon: I am frankly not sure that the core problem with surrogacy
parental rights was reversed and her rights restored by the Supreme Court of New Jersey while
custody was allowed to rest with the biological father and his wife.
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is that money is being exchanged to obtain a child, since people are in a
sense purchasing children when they pay doctors for their services. The
larger problem is that the availability and quality of medical services nec-
essary to conceive or bear or raise a child depends on wealth rather than
entitlement. I don't think that selling a child into slavery is really compa-
rable to exchanging money to provide a wanted child. The angst ex-
pressed over the impact on the children seems little different from
people's worries about any departure from the traditional heterosexual
norm. However, I am very concerned about the child of such an arrange-
ment who becomes unwanted. I fear that the drive for a perfect child is
exacerbated in surrogacy arrangements and that the prospective parents
will be unwilling to accept their disabled child.
What moves me to consider controlling or prohibiting paid surro-
gacy is the fear that women will be commodified in the process. Surro-
gacy contracts contain outrageous provisions dictating how women
should handle their pregnancies. If in vitro fertilization techniques im-
prove, allowing for the implantation of the perfect embryo in any womb,
I fear the potential for the creation of a breeder class, impressing the
poorest and most desperate women into this service.
While I am constantly arguing with myself on this subject, I feel
quite certain about two things: we must both fight for the unenforceabil-
ity of surrogacy contracts and oppose their prohibition. To refuse as a
society to enforce surrogacy agreements that become involuntary pro-
tects a woman's basic integrity and operates as a substantial, but I think
warranted, discouragement of the process. In my view, the woman can be
paid only for the service of being pregnant and not for turning over the
child. Payment constitutes recognition that pregnancy is work and not
invisible, natural, and simply expectable. Turning over the child must be
a free act of will untainted by financial need or desperation. A woman's
contract in that regard is an ethical promise, but not an enforceable one.
If she has engaged in fraud, there are separate remedies for that. The
prospective parents in a surrogacy arrangement must take a number of
risks. As in adoption, their expectations may be dashed; as in open adop-
tion, they will have a responsibility in some cases to maintain some rela-
tionship between the gestational mother and the child if she gives them
custody, or between themselves and the child if she doesn't.
I think we must oppose criminalization, not because I like paid sur-
rogacy, but because it will exacerbate the exploitation and commodifica-
tion of women. If the exchange of money is made illegal, then we will
replicate the exploitation that is the product of the criminalization of
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prostitution. It will be easier to impress women into breeder service, they
will have less rights to change their minds or assert their autonomy, and,
I suspect, they will receive even less for their work. Criminalization
breeds dependency, strips a person of the legal right to protection, and
stigmatizes the woman for her conduct. Just as with sex, the demand for
women to bear children is likely to be too powerful to deter with criminal
sanction. Instead we have to grapple with how to preserve the dignity of
women in the process.
Hubbard: If you are going to recognize labor as a commodity then it
seems to me that surrogacy will have to be radically restructured. A so-
called surrogate mother would have to get her $10,000 or whatever the
price, irrespective of outcome. But this is not happening. In some ways I
agree that, if she wants to do that as her way to earn a wage, so be it. But
then it would have to be structured that way. She would have to get the
wage for the labor of pregnancy and birth, not for handing over a baby.
Audience: I was struck all along with how powerful the connection
is between the assertion of rights and commodification. Once one enter-
tains that connection, there is no escape. We bring market culture to
these questions. The only escape is to stop thinking about it as a rights
issue and to start thinking about it as a question of community. I can
imagine a surrogate situation in which fertility was seen as a really won-
derful thing, something that one could share in a really nice way. It
would be very positive and wouldn't raise the kind of dilemmas that we
are talking about. That would presuppose a community in which every-
thing didn't have to get translated into a question of rights and therefore
a question of commodity. It would be better if we had a nonindividualis-
tic culture. Every time you say "my rights," it is a statement of exclusion.
Because it is a statement of exclusion, it is a statement of commodifica-
tion and, by definition, anti-community.
Copelon: Perhaps I don't fully understand, but I certainly don't
agree that every statement of rights is an act of commodification. The
right to define one's sexuality or make procreative decisions may well be
an entitlement to resist commodification. Women were commodified in
the rightless world of coverture and traditional marriage. Slavery is cer-
tainly the paradigm of rightlessness and commodification.
I also don't agree that every statement of rights is a statement of
exclusion. The black, women's, lesbian-gay, and disability rights move-
ments, among others, have asserted rights for the purpose of inclusion.
This is also true of the right to bodily integrity. The danger is that we
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settle for inclusion into a system whose terms and reality our movements
set out to challenge.
Finally, I must take issue with the idea that any statement of exclu-
sion based on rights is negative. The demand that women be essentially
communitarian rather than self-regarding has been historically a key as-
pect of our subordination. While some of our oppression flows from the
fact that we are told to be communitarian in an otherwise capitalistic
society, I find it hard to imagine feeling safe in a communitarian process
where I had no power to say "no," particularly in regard to sex and
reproduction. I agree that we need to build a culture of reproductive
generosity and I think a broad commitment to communitarianism would
change the process of decision making. But if the woman's decision is not
respected, which seems to implicate rights, then communitarianism is a
friendly word for coercion.
Rothman: There is a tension between notions of individualism and
notions of community which usually restrict some individual choices.
But the reality is that women in reproductive decision making do not
have individual choice, autonomy, rights, or community support. Either
individualism or community would be preferable to this situation.
Omolade: The oppressed in this country have always spoken of us-
ing the law to guarantee their rights. Unless there is some other cultural
and ideological way of shaping thought and behavior, the law and rights
analysis is the most effective force we have to assure that people of color
can survive and exist in this society. Without rights analysis, how do we
make sure that individuals who don't want black people in their society
cannot force them out of the society? Unless we use law and rights analy-
sis, how do we affirm cultural values of universal humanity and tolerance
of difference against those who seek to limit and restrict others because of
their gender or race? If I can't say in a court of law, "You violated my
rights," what do I say?
Audience: It seems to me that in the process of saying, "You vio-
lated my rights," you're wielding a double-edged sword.
Omolade: How would you articulate a position that does not reflect
that double bind? Is there any other kind of statement that could be
made in court about race and gender discrimination?
Audience: What you have to say in court differs from what people
need to say to each other when they are really being honest. I guess I'm
more concerned with the latter. The key is that when we talk to each
other we are clear that we're not about rights but rather that we're about
something else-the possibility of a better community. Some of us lis-
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tened to Oren Lyons, a Native American speaker who is very powerful.
In his community, if you have something that one could think of as an
advantage, it carries responsibility with it. I can think of fertility as an
advantage that carries with it a responsibility of sharing that could be
freely and happily given, not something that was coerced by others be-
cause you're part of the community. It seems possible to live that way.
It's just that we can't think of it very clearly because we are so bound up
in thinking that the only freedom that we can have is the notion of rights.
I didn't think that's what freedom was all about.
Omolade: Native Americans would argue that to protect that kind
of traditional society they would have to fight for land rights and the
rights of native peoples to the land. It sounds as though there is another
double edge. To keep the communal way of life alive, they have to fight
forces outside the community which would deny community members
the rights to occupy and use land as they wish.
Audience: My sense is that in that community, they don't talk to
each other about rights. That's not part of the community. But when
they are dealing with the people outside who are a threat, then sometimes
they've got to use the language of rights.
Audience: I'm just flabbergasted by this discussion. The last thing I
want to submit to communal determination is sexual expression-the last
thing because the nature of it is individual. If you want to know what's
done more for women's sexual freedom in the whole history of the
human race, it has been an ideology of individual expression, not notions
of communality. Historically, communality has been a restraint on wo-
men's sexual behavior. Equal rights to individual expression protect vari-
ety and difference.
Audience: Community could value difference.
Audience: But that is an individualist ethic of difference, of individ-
ual expression recognized and protected communally.
Copelon: That's right and that's why I'm not willing to give up
rights in a communitarian society. To be legitimate, a communal ideol-
ogy must embrace the notion of entitlement to self-determination. I don't
think we will ever get to the end of the tension between normalcy and
taboo. I'm not sure that a society that wants something badly enough,
whether it be procreators or workers, is going to unswervingly respect its
dissidents without an entitlement to dissent. I would hope that the pro-
cess of decision making in a communitarian society would enhance the
possibility of respect for difference, but I would not give up individual
veto power.
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Audience: There can be a community where people share moral and
ethical values about individual autonomy and their rights and distinguish
them from the struggle to assert and prove and enforce legal rights in an
adversarial arena of the courtroom. This distinction is important because
to talk about community doesn't necessarily mean that you don't value
all kinds of individual differences.
Omolade: The history of communalism and tribalism (if you will)
has been riddled with tremendous inequality and oppression. But there is
a desire to build a new communalism using the notion of individual
rights and collective concerns. To build this kind of future community,
we must become much more aware of daily oppression of people who are
different from white, middle class males. We must also have tolerance
from those who have very different cultural values and attachments to
communalism.
It is, however, very difficult to envision an informal method of devel-
oping community without extending and expanding upon the legal strat-
egies which have already worked. The informal legal ways have a trap.
Suppose white people don't want people of color in that envisioned com-
munity, or suppose they don't know how to include people of color. If
the process were informal and not legally binding, there would not be a
single black person in the room to talk about community. Thus, when we
discuss community, there is a concern about how we move from step A,
what we have now, to step B, what we envision, without defending civil
and women's rights. My question is how do we expand those rights so we
can assure our forward movement?
Marcus: I want to push this from the more abstract to a slightly
more concrete level. Let's go beyond the surrogate situation to talk about
the situation that Ruth described this morning. In that situation there are
five parents: the woman who gestates, the biological donors, and the per-
sons who rear the child. What does the assertion of rights do? Do you use
rights language to order the situation?
Copelon: There is a problem with both the assertion of rights and the
nature of the rights that would be asserted under prevailing law. First, as
to the assertion of rights. One would hope all the people who want some
form of relationship to the child could achieve it through agreement
based on regard for the interests of others as well as the child, rather than
through an antagonistic assertion of rights. Even under existing condi-
tions, agreements are made. We do not hear about the situations where
surrogate mothers changed their minds and were not challenged. How-
ever, social pressures militate toward antagonism.
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The definition of parenthood, according to the traditional, albeit
waning, white middle class norm, assumes genetic connection and exclu-
sive control over the child. Closed adoption and the trial court's termina-
tion of Mary Beth Whitehead's parental rights illustrate the potential
intensity of this drive for control. A second source of pressure is the as-
signment to the family or the private realm of the responsibility for eco-
nomic support. Since parental rights carry an obligation to provide
support, the state has a stake in identifying people it can hold to that
responsibility. Where control or possession is attenuated, for example
where one parent has custody, the noncustodial parent cannot be
counted on to provide child support. A third is the heterosexist norm
that defines family as minimally consisting of a mother and father, pref-
erably married, and children.
At another conference on reproductive technologies, Barbara Omo-
lade suggested that the ultimate infertility is social not biological. If the
issue is meaningful relationships with children, then social infertility is
the consequence of the failure of society and law to recognize parenting
when done by members of unrecognized relationships, whether an ex-
tended family, a lesbian or gay couple, or a friendship network. As a
consequence, the nature of the claim of right is not the desire to have a
meaningful relationship with the child, but to have control in one of the
two approved roles.
If we changed the social organization of childrearing and the priva-
tization of familial support, I think it is less likely we would have surro-
gacy arrangements because a greater variety of meaningful relationships
with children would be validated. It also seems that the five would be
more likely to work things out without the need to fit two people into the
rigidly defined categories of mother and father. I would be tempted to
use the occasion to abolish the dichotomous terms mother and father
which remain the most tenancious example of gendered terminology.
Perhaps I'd retain the word mother, honor it, and give it to anyone who
assumes active parental responsibility.
There is a chance that the new technologies, because they depend on
already validated claims based on genetic, gestational, and social contri-
butions, will require that the law open a broader range of relationships to
resolve the conflict of rights. The problem is that traditional norms,
which have been challenged in so many ways, are likely to be reaffirmed
by the decisions required by the new configurations produced by
technology.
Omolade: In our society, there are children who have many social
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parents and whose situations approximate that of a child with different
biological parents and social parents because of the new reproductive
technologies. A tradition in black families assumes that blood and non-
blood kin raise the child. Everybody in the household raises the child.
We also have a tradition of informal adoptions, women and men who
leave the child with their parents or siblings to raise. By studying those
cultures, one could easily examine the relationship between the five
adults and the child. It becomes problematic when one of the adults feels
that the child belongs to him or her and the adult resorts to legal ways of
resolving the conflict. We can again turn to the cultural practices of peo-
ple of color and white ethnic groups to discover informal, nonlegal, and
effective ways of resolving conflict about childrearing.
Marcus: When we talk the language of rights in this context, rights
become sex role specific. The ideology of the sex-gender system exists
outside and inside the home. It affects who we are and how we view
ourselves. To, me the discussion about who the people are and how we
cast them, how we identify them in the new reproductive technologies,
whether we use rights discourse, and what that implies is not something
out there just for the law. It has profound personal implications. Even if
we didn't use the term rights, we would be likely to talk about claims,
control, and exclusion. That's what makes me more pessimistic about it.
It profoundly affects the way we think about ourselves, how we connect
with each other in intimate situations, the way we talk about children or
complex pluralistic family arrangements, and the extent to which the
new technologies will aid or abet the reordering of relationships between
women and men. My pessimistic assumption is that these issues will be
played out in rights discourse which, in turn, will accelerate the trend
about which I think we all have ambivalent feelings.
Omolade: Alternatives to this horrific direction can be found in the
cultural practices of people of color and white ethnic groups. They might
respond by saying to the concerned adults: "You must share this child
with other people, their blood and nonblood parents and kin; that's the
way we do things in this community, culture, or group." Sharing be-
comes the value, not individual ownership. The current social dogma on
parenting says that to have a child, to rear her or him properly, you have
to be middle class, which means married and heterosexual. We must pay
more attention to discovering how other people live with childbearing
within alternative situations: poor people, single mothers, nonresidential
fathers, and gay and lesbian couples.
Copelon: I agree that we need to move towards a more sharing
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model. But we also have to recognize that people who are currently dis-
couraged from creating families need to exclude others to create some-
thing new. Of course, they are precisely the group that may be least
benefited by the assignment of rights, given that cultural norms have so
powerful an effect on that process. Thus with donor insemination, we
have the courts happily embracing donors who have changed their minds
in order to give the child a father. At the same time, we saw in the Baby
M case a powerful drive to eliminate the mother and, thereby, protect the
traditional middle class family model.
Hubbard: The expert testimony in the Baby M case is a caricature
that displays white, middle class, professional expectations of the caring
parents for everyone to see.
Audience: It strikes me that there is a spread of a kind of an individ-
ualist ideology associated with rights discourse. I think back a couple of
generations and recall how grandparents and uncles and aunts would
take care of children. If the parents died, the kids would move over to
their relatives. These were communal obligations and duties which were
not always joyous. I don't know whether it is a function exclusively of
class or of the increasing spread of an ethos of individualism which leads
to a disconnection between people and their inability to work together.
Rothman: People of higher social class do have other people raising
their kids. It is just that they have control over them. They hire one
person to raise their baby. If they find that she doesn't provide enough
stimulation, they fire her when the kid is two. When you talk to those
housekeepers, you find that they put a lot of energy into that kid and
they miss that child. Their right to that child, their sweat equity in that
child, their enormous childrearing tasks for two years, are worth noth-
ing. If the housekeeper gets two weeks notice, she is in good shape. The
parents hire someone else for another couple years, and then somebody
else. They have the right to have control economically.
Audience: But does it make a difference that it's bought and paid for,
as opposed to offered on some other noncommodified basis?
Rothman: When you talk to women who are in working class posi-
tions, they say, "My mother is watching the kids because I can't afford a
housekeeper. My mother is watching the kids. Boy, do I pay for it. I'm
paying for it in obligations to my mother. My mother has rights over
these kids. I cannot say, 'No mom, do it my way.' I have to do it her way.
When I have enough money, I can control it and raise my kid in my way.
When I don't have money, I have to do it her way." The higher you are
in this system, the more manipulative you can be with people that you
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buy because there is no reciprocal pressure. They have no leverage. If
they try to pressure the parents, the only leverage they have is the emo-
tions of the child and then the parents fire them immediately. That's evil.
Omolade: From my experiences as a black woman, it's different
when it's your mother, even though you have problems with your
mother. She is your closest, most reliable relative. The child and grand-
mother have wonderful experiences with each other.
Audience: The bad part is that people who didn't have enough to
begin with had to extend themselves further to take in a child at great
personal costs. It was a double-sided experience. People could depend on
one another in some way that was really good. On the other hand, they
felt obligated. Maybe sensing that your mother has control over your
child is not entirely a good feeling.
Omolade: But I still think that some of those models of childrearing
might be useful.
Audience: I'm suggesting that rights talk is one part of a situation
which helps create and perpetuate an ethos of individualism, making it
more difficult to have connection with people.
Audience: The question we're asking is, where does this desire to
privatize one's children come from? You can make fun of maternal in-
stincts easily enough. Is the wish to have or to own one's own children an
historical development? I don't know how to describe that history be-
cause all we are talking about is economic capacity.
Hubbard: It certainly must have something to do with our isolation,
the fact that we have relatively few people except children with whom we
can share love, dependency, responsibility, and longterm attachments.
Audience: That's the best interpretation of it. The more negative in-
terpretation is that historically people have been confused with their ca-
pacity to reproduce. When they don't have children, they are nothing.
Men have deep emotional attachments to creating genetic heirs to pass
on that which they earned. In her book Women's Body Women's Right,21
Linda Gordon states that there are all kinds of historically oppressive
reasons adults need children, ways that are not particularly helpful to
children.
Rothman: Here is an interesting point that speaks to class-based dif-
ferences in ownership. The Sterns played a tape of a conversation be-
tween them and Mary Beth Whitehead. They focused on Whitehead's
suicide threats. But they discounted another part of the tape in which
21. L. GORDON, supra note 13.
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there was a discussion about custody. Whitehead's claim wasn't for ex-
clusive ownership. She kept saying, "Can't I take the child every other
weekend?" The Stems were the ones who said if she has any claim at all,
we want none. All or nothing. Whitehead was saying, "Our child, Bill.
Don't say my child. She's our child."
Copelon: Which indicates the tendency of rights to go toward exclu-
sivity as'opposed to mutual claims.
Rothman: But maybe it's a class issue: who thinks they could ever
have exclusive rights to anything, and who just wants a share of
something.
Omolade: Ownership conflicts surface around issues of child sup-
port, both inside and outside the court system, and involve all classes of
men. When the mother asks the nonresidential father for child support,
he feels he has the option to say yes or no, especially if he views the
mother and the child as one unit. He might not support the child because
he can't have the mother or because he has lost the mother. The tension
is not merely in the Baby M case and surrogacy, but throughout all
parenting in a patriarchal system. When women who have separated
from or divorced their husbands request child support, they also have to
deal with the issues of male possession of children and women.
Rothman: Men with money and sperm can purchase babies. Mrs.
Stem couldn't purchase that baby by herself. Whitehead couldn't qualify
herself. This is what is so particularly, uniquely dangerous for women
about reproductive technology. It is only technology for rich men who
expect that money can purchase control.
Copelon: As a class matter, men are more able to purchase
childbearing assistance. But the availability of various technologies is re-
sponsive to women's desire to reproduce as well. Some argue that women
are less interested in genetic connection, but are more likely to seek the
experience of pregnancy. I know women of both persuasions so I think
there is danger in generalizing. It is important to recognize that the in-
tensity of desire-the lengths to which one will go to reproduce-is
shaped by social circumstances. We are currently witnessing the con-
struction of a fertility panic, whether one looks at the Style page of the
New York Times or the recent movie listings. It has to do with reaffirm-
ing motherhood, romanticizing fatherhood, and denying that there could
be different degrees of meaningful and continuous relationships with
children.
I'd like to go back for a minute to Isabel's concern about the danger
of solving the problem of the five parents through assignment of rights.
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There is a larger problem with our focus on reproductive technologies or
individual privileged solutions as a response to biological infertility. In-
fertility is a significant problem that in many cases can be avoided rather
than tinkered with. The riveting drama of the Baby M case threatens to
divert our attention from the need for preventive health measures. Like-
wise, the focus on the conflict of rights threatens to obscure the irrele-
vance of individualistic rights to a broader social solution. Ther6 appears
to be far less enthusiasm for technological efforts to clean up pollutants
and change our lifestyles than for the treatment of individual infertility
and the allocation of rights. As Ruth Hubbard mentioned this morning,
rights analysis comes into play as a consequence of failed social policy.
The consequence is that no one is safe, but the poor least of all.
Because of poverty, black women experience a higher rate of biological
infertility than white women, together with one of the highest rates of
infant mortality in the industrialized world. Yet the reproductive tech-
nologies are accessible only to those with means andi therefore, provide
the least relief to those with the greatest need. Beyond that, they divert
the public into thinking something is being done and thus render the
problem invisible, individualized, and unaddressed.
Omolade: Are you saying that, if there were two sorts of cases, one
around an individual life concern and one around a social policy issue
such as access to resources, the latter are the kinds of case we should be
litigating?
Copelon: I think both battles have to be fought. It is critical to wo-
men to establish that the gestational mother cannot alienate her constitu-
tional rights by contract before birth, and to fight sexist, racist, and
classist stereotypes where they emerge. But it is also critical that we not
become absorbed by the issues of individual rights. We must devote our-
selves with no less vigor to the longer term and lower visibility efforts to
secure the necessary preventive measures.
The white middle class feminist movement has gravitated toward
the former. Abortion rights have been defended without sufficient atten-
tion to abuse or to the necessity of guaranteeing conditions to facilitate
procreation. Opposition to the abuses of reproductive technologies
threatens to take precedence over concern for access by the poor or the
prevention of infant mortality.
In this regard, I would like to raise one other increasingly pressing
issue before this conversation closes. That is AIDS and reproduction. A
disproportionate amount of governmental and media energy is being fo-
cused on screening pregnant women, with the goal of encouraging those
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who test HIV-positive to abort. A baby with AIDS is a tragedy, but not
every infected woman will have a sick or HIV-infected child. Indeed,
studies suggest that fifty to seventy percent of babies born to infected
mothers will be free of the virus, although all will test positive until their
own immune systems develop, which can take over a year. Those babies
who are infected tend to develop the disease very young and die. Women
should have access to HIV testing and to non-goal directed genetic coun-
seling on whether to test and whether to continue the pregnancy. But the
drive to screen high risk pregnant women has little to do with preventing
transmission of AIDS or even the suffering of AIDS babies. Approxi-
mately eighty-five percent of the AIDS babies are born to women of
color, most of whom acquired the virus through IV drug use or sex with
an IV drug user. The focus on AIDS screening involves stigmatizing inel-
igible reproducers. It is no surprise that the medical, social, and poten-
tially legal response to a reproductive danger affecting primarily poor
women of color is to try to foreclose reproduction, rather than trying to
facilitate safe reproduction. And just as surrogacy is not a real solution to
biological infertility, so AIDS testing, which identifies and converts peo-
ple into victims, is no substitute for massive preventive social programs.
Hubbard: I've served on a task force where I have seen a lot of effec-
tive gay rights pressure to block HIV-antibody screening. The weak
points are prenatal screening and screening of prostitutes. Unless we
have a strong, organized feminist response for these situations, that's
where HIV-antibody screening will sneak in, and that will open the door
to across-the-board HIV-antibody screening and to prenatal screening
for other reasons. I think we're in a very dangerous place right now.
Within the next months, I suspect we are going to get states beginning to
legislate in those two areas: prenatal HIV-antibody screening and screen-
ing of prostitutes.
Copelon: Everything we have spoken of today underscores the need
for organized and broad-based feminist responses that attempt to tran-
scend our own differences as well as link all the assaults on women's
reproductive rights. It is through organizing that we can affect the values
that underlie both the definition and allocation of rights and the direction
of technology. And, in all our work, whether in the courts, legislatures,
or public fora, we must argue for a conception of rights that includes
governmental responsibility to facilitate the preservation of reproduction
capacity and the conditions for reproductive choice for everyone.
Omolade: I am concerned that feminist responses emerge from a di-
alogue between white women and women of color. I'm very sensitive to
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the exclusion of black and other women of color from the group that
finally made a public statement about the Baby M case. Black feminists
have responded in many similar ways to the portrayal of black mothers
in the media and to the treatment of teenage motherhood. These issues
are interrelated, yet there is a separate response. We need to pool our
resources and our insights.
Marcus: We've spent an entire day talking about a broad range of
issues regarding reproductive technology. By no means have we ex-
hausted the subject. The message is clear. We need many more serious
conversations and discussions in order to make well-informed sensitive
choices.

